Islam in Europe and the United States
A Comparative Perspective

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Preface

This conference was held before the tragic events of September 11, 2001, when a group of terrorists professing Islam hijacked U.S. passenger planes and crashed them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and Shanksville, Pennsylvania, causing severe human and material loss. These wanton acts of terrorism shocked the world and generated unanimous condemnation, including on the part of the Muslim world. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in both Europe and America also condemned these acts of terrorism. There were only few isolated voices, which offered support to these maniacal acts, but overall Muslims joined the rest of the world in grieving for the victims of this tragedy.

These tragic events understandably created a negative backlash against Muslims both in Europe and the United States. Consequently, Muslim communities in America and Europe and their institutions have faced brutal attacks and continue to be subjected to various forms of abuse. New Jersey alone reported 80 hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims, and countless mosques in other states were vandalized or threatened. In a London suburb, an Afghan taxi driver was left paralyzed after being attacked by his passengers, and two men using a baseball bat attacked a 19-year-old Muslim woman. In Manchester, England, half a dozen mosques were attacked and one firebombed. In Brisbane, Australia, a mosque was destroyed. In the Netherlands, part of a Muslim primary school was burned down, and mosques in three cities were vandalized. Similar incidents were reported in Poland, Germany, and Denmark. Certainly the tragedy of September 11 set back the process of Muslim integration into American and European societies. Indeed, in light of the post–September 11 developments, the papers in this report may seem to be optimistic in their analysis.

Yet in the midst of all this there were signs of official and unofficial goodwill towards Muslims. To begin with, Western leaders extended their support to the Muslim community and distinguished between terrorist acts and Islam. President George W. Bush in the immediate aftermath of this tragedy invited a Muslim cleric to participate in the memorial service at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., and then visited the Washington Islamic Center, stating, “Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace.” New York mayor Rudolf Giuliani and a number of senators and congressman concurred, as did German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder when he said that nobody wished to hold Islam responsible for this act. British prime minister Tony Blair met with members of the Muslim Council of Britain to discuss fears of a backlash, while Prince Charles visited a mosque in the Borough of Hackney and the Queen held a service at Westminster Abbey for all the bereaved, including Muslims. Christian and Jewish religious leaders encouraged
their communities to support their Muslim friends and neighbors. These are a few examples of the steps that were taken in support of the Muslim community and to protect them from a backlash.

Perhaps more importantly, many ordinary people distinguished between Islam and the terrorists. To illustrate, according to a poll conducted by Zogby International one month after the terrorist attacks, 54 percent of Americans disagreed that Islam encourages fanaticism, 28 percent believed that it does, and 16 percent said they were not sure. Hence, a total of 44 percent of the American public either holds an unclear view of Islam or does not understand the religion.

A similar situation prevails in Europe. What this situation means is that despite setbacks, the process of the Muslims’ gradual integration into American and European societies will continue; it has become more urgent that this integration take place; and there is a great need for dialogue and better understanding between Muslims and Americans and Europeans.

In particular, Muslims need to work harder at explaining their faith and its principles and not let the extremist and/or obscurantist voices be seen as representing Islam. For their own sake, and for the sake of harmony within the rest of the European and American societies, Muslim communities should also do a better job counteracting the influence of extremists by better education of Muslim youth in the principles of their faith and promoting a culture of coexistence and tolerance.
During the last three decades, Islam has emerged as the second religion of Europe after Christianity, as the ranks of Muslim communities have swelled in all major countries of Western Europe. Meanwhile, following the collapse of the Soviet empire, parts of Southeastern Europe with long-established Muslim communities, have rejoined the continent politically. Thus, while still constituting a very small percentage of Europe’s total population, Muslims and Islam are becoming part of its cultural, social, and political landscape. Nor is this situation likely to change. Rather, in view of demographic trends in Europe and the projected need for immigrant labor, the Muslim presence will become more substantial. In the United States, too, the number of Muslims is increasing, although they form a smaller percentage of the total population than in Europe.

The process of Islam’s introduction into Europe and the United States has been different in the two cases. In Europe, Muslim communities are essentially the result of the labor migrations of the 1960s and 1970s, to which were added migrants fleeing political turmoil and civil war. In the United States, by contrast, between 30 and 40 percent of the Muslim population consists of indigenous African-Americans. Also in the United States, the percentage of Muslims who enter professions is higher than in Europe. Similarly, differences in the sociopolitical, and cultural context of America and Europe affect Muslims in different ways, and in turn, the broader societies experience the impact of Islam differently in Europe and America.

Nevertheless, there are similarities in the challenges that Muslim communities are facing in terms of adapting to, and integrating into, European and American societies, while retaining their religion and culture, as well as in the challenges that their presence is posing to the broader societies.

The process of the adaptation and integration of Europe and America’s Muslim communities in the broader society is being complicated by the intensification of interaction between these communities and the rest of the Islamic world—a development that itself stems largely from the communications revolution and the phenomenon of globalization.
This enhanced interaction has both positive and negative dimensions. On the positive side, the experience of life in open and democratic societies is leading Muslim intellectuals and even ordinary Muslims to develop new approaches to the study and interpretation of their religion and to try to synthesize Islam and modernity. In turn, these new ideas are making their way into the Islamic world. On the negative side, certain extremist tendencies, at times with violent propensities, are making inroads in the Muslim communities of Europe and the United States, thereby creating tensions within the Muslim communities and between it and broader society.

Extremist rhetoric and, at times, violent actions of certain Muslims—although a small minority—are jeopardizing the successful integration of Muslims in Europe and America and are fostering anti-Muslim sentiments. Meanwhile, the conflicts, which bedevil the Muslim world, are also having a deleterious impact on Muslim communities in the West.

Islam, both in Europe and in the United States, is likely to remain part of the sociopolitical landscape. Meanwhile the Muslim world will remain of great economic and strategic interest to Europe, and increasingly to the United States, as well. Therefore, it is important to ensure the integration of Muslim communities into European and American societies and to prevent their infection by radical ideas. But in order to do so, it is first necessary to have a correct picture of these Muslim communities in the various dimensions and dynamics that are affecting their development and evolution.

It was in recognition of this reality that the CSIS Islam Program, in collaboration with the Luso-American Development Foundation (FLAD), held a conference in Washington, D.C., on April 24, 2001, on the theme of “Islam in Europe and America: A Comparative Perspective.” The conference brought together distinguished scholars from the United States and Europe to talk about various aspects of Muslim communities and the challenges of integration in, and accommodation with, the broader societies.

This conference was the second important collaboration between CSIS and FLAD. The first was a major conference held in Lisbon on October 16–17, 2000, on the theme of “Islam in Europe.” The papers presented at the Lisbon conference will appear later in 2002 as an edited volume, entitled Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape (Praeger/CSIS, forthcoming).

It is hoped that this effort will contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of Muslim communities in Europe and the United States and help in promoting a culture of coexistence and mutual acceptance.
We live at a religiously momentous time, witnessing a global religious resurgence of all major faiths, as well as the geographic globalization of many religions, due to migration and emigration. Demographically, Islam stands out as being among the fastest growing religions, both globally and in the West. Only a few decades ago, Muslims were relatively invisible in the West, but today the religious landscape of many Western cities and towns includes mosques and Islamic centers alongside churches and synagogues. In fact, major Muslim communities and cities of the world today include not only Cairo, Damascus, Islamabad, and Kuala Lumpur, among others, but also London, Bradford, Paris, Marseilles, New York, Washington, Detroit, and Los Angeles. This is an important reality, which must be taken into account. Some points that I will identify and discuss may appear to be truisms. Yet they need to be looked at in the context of discussions regarding how Western governments and societies respond to Muslims.

Until very recently, and certainly not in the 1960s and 1970s, no one talked about Islam in the United States or Europe. Islam and Muslims were not present on the Western sociopolitical landscape, and very few people were even aware of their existence in our midst. In short, only a few decades ago, there was no awareness that Islam had any relevance to what was happening in Western societies. In view of this history, it is no wonder that the process of adaptation and adjustment, for both sides, has been difficult; and we should not be surprised that, in fact, both sides still face significant problems.

Once a greater consciousness of Islam emerged in the West, it was mostly in terms of Islam versus the West, and the relationship was often seen within a context of conflict and confrontation. Islam was viewed as a foreign religion and distinct from the Judeo-Christian tradition, a perception that reinforced the sense of “us” and “them,” not only demographically, but also religiously and culturally. This atti-
tude still persists to a certain degree, and it emerges when a number of difficult issues are faced by Western societies.

Yet, despite problems, the long regarded “other” must now be viewed as part of the fabric of Western societies and as neighbors, citizens, and believers. This is a serious challenge. I tend to be among those who think that matters have improved in the last decade; but there are still problems.

Challenge of Integration

Like many other immigrants of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds, Muslims have been challenged to define and determine their place in U.S. society. In trying to do so, they struggle with issues related to identity, intermarriage, gender relations, worship, education, as well as issues related to civil rights and social and political responsibilities. Muslims are going through the same processes that other, earlier immigrant communities did. Yet most of these minorities, from the policymaker to local citizens, do not often identify with what Muslims are experiencing. They have simply forgotten their earlier experiences. Thus, educated Poles, Irish, and Italians, who have succeeded in the United States, talk about Muslims and their struggles in a way that shows that they see no similarity between their own past experiences and Muslims’ current struggles.

In short, Muslims are grappling with a sense of disassociation within Western societies. This feeling is compounded by the fact that people in the older generation, as one young Muslim put it, often tend to live in denial of the fact that they have lived in America for 30 years and are not going back to Pakistan or wherever else they came from. Rather, they are going to die here. Sulayman Nyang has analyzed this phenomenon, calling it “the myth of return.”

Comparing the Muslim Experience in Europe and the United States

Despite some commonalities of experience, there are considerable differences between Muslims in Western Europe and those in North America. These differences partly derive from the characteristics of the two communities. Most Muslims in Europe are labor migrants. This status puts them at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to obtain influence and respect in the societies in which they live. In encounters with Muslims in Sweden, I have heard them speak about their inability to influence the society, despite their numbers, because of their status as laborers. Similarly, I have heard complaints from British Muslims who can be characterized as upscale and relatively successful. These British Muslims in their 20s and 30s speak with a sense of impotence in terms of their ability to influence society and government, which you do not hear from American Muslims. This type of British Muslim is not optimistic about the ability of the Muslim community to build strong institutions and become capable of participating effectively within society. These Muslims
often compare their situation with American Muslims and say, “It is not like the United States. We do not quite have the human resources.” Thus the fact that most European Muslims are laborers, unlike in the United States where most are professionals, becomes an important factor distinguishing the two communities.

Muslim communities, both in Europe and the United States, are divided between those who succeed and those who remain trapped in poverty and live in ghetto-like conditions. But the tendency of most of the non-Muslim community is to see Muslims only in terms of those who do not succeed and who live in and struggle with poverty and deprivation. Thus they tend to see Muslims in terms of stereotypes.

As an Italian-American, I have experienced the impact of similar stereotypes even from long-standing friends. For example, a friend whom I used to meet every five years would invariably ask me about my children and garden, although I had told him every time I saw him that I had no children and no garden. But for him, Italians were associated with having large families and growing zucchinis.

Dealing with this type of stereotyping is a major challenge for Muslims in Europe and the United States. The community is viewed as fundamentally different religiously and culturally. In Europe, this is because they are laborers and poor. The mother of a friend who teaches at an elite school in Paris always talks about Algerians or North Africans as being unclean, a problem to society, and a real danger to French identity, morals, and values.

In short, American and European societies have not yet realized the need to recognize that their Muslim populations are far from monolithic in composition, attitudes, and practices. Rather, Muslims, like Jewish and Christian populations, form a mosaic of ethnic, racial, national, and socioeconomic groups. These differences do exist. However much Muslims may talk about the Islamic umma, which transcends ethnic and racial and class differences, in reality Muslims can be very conscious of their ethnic and racial roots. This reality is reflected in the organization of mosques in most European countries, which is along ethnic lines. Thus there are Turkish, Pakistani, and Arab mosques and the differences and debates that divide them.

Muslims’ issues, like those of other religious minorities, are about assimilation and integration; about the preservation and practice of their religious faith in societies based upon Judeo-Christian or secular values; about empowerment in the politics and culture of the majority society. The dynamics of these contradictory objectives cause tensions between Muslims and the rest of society. On the one hand, non-Muslims talk constructively and say to Muslims that they should become more actively involved in society. On the other hand, very often when Muslims try to do so and claim a share in power, other groups feel threatened and resent Muslim activism. These problems are exacerbated because of certain international issues, which divide Muslims and other communities. For example, divergent attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict complicate relations between American Mus-
lims and Jews, and the problem of Kashmir causes difficulties between America’s Pakistani and Indian populations.

More fundamentally, the situation is complicated by the difficult historical legacy of relations between Islam and Christianity. While there have been periods of Christian-Muslim cooperation, there have also been clear and long periods of conflict. These periods of conflict and mutual distrust include the Crusades, European colonialism, charges of American neocolonialism, the World Trade Center bombings in 1993, bombings in Paris, fears of Osama bin Laden, and the promotion of global terrorism by some extremist groups.

Questions related to language, community, and faith have spawned deep and significant differences within the Muslim community. These differences are exacerbated by difficulties that Muslims encounter within American and European societies, in which Islam is still characterized by stereotypes and Muslims are viewed with fear and distrust. Muslims are seen as more militant, and Islam is viewed as a religion that is inherently violent and militant, religiously and culturally. Indeed, there is a whole set of stereotypes that remain alive and operative.

Living as a minority in a dominant culture that is often ignorant about Islam or even hostile to it, many Muslims experience a sense of marginalization, alienation, and powerlessness. The United States and Europe also have to deal with the results of such feelings. Muslims are challenged by a United States and Europe that, despite the separation of church and state, retain a Judeo-Christian ethos and a secular bias.

The media’s image of Islam and Muslims as militant and as the principal global threat in the post–Cold War period, equating Islam with extremism and terrorism, is very much alive. For their part, Muslims are critical of what they see to be the West’s unquestioned support for Israel and its checkered record with regard to Bosnia, Chechnya, and Kashmir. But when Muslim populations try to seek redress for these grievances in their new homelands, often they come to be seen even more as foreigners. These grievances become even more of an issue because people often do not see the Muslims’ domestic problems. The media do not see their struggles of integration and claiming a place, but rather focus on the international or “foreign” issues. Consequently, this is the sort of issue that non-Muslims become aware of and associate with Muslims.

Double Standards

Other problems derive from the fact that Western societies as yet often do not make the same allowances for Islam and Muslim religious practices as they have done for Judaism and Christianity. That creates significant problems. An analysis of the role of mosques and imams in Europe and the United States illustrates some of these problems. In Europe and the United States, often mosques and imams take on a new configuration, which is different from the role they play in majority Muslim countries. The mosque takes on the role of a community center, a place for people
to meet, a place for people not only to worship but to discuss social and political
issues. Meanwhile, imams come from overseas, from outside, and are unfamiliar
with the problems of their new communities. Many of them even have no idea that
they have left their motherland or home country. In fact, they may live in the
United States for 10 years but do not know it.

Professor Yvonne Haddad and I once did a television program together—John
McLaughlin’s One-on-One—with an imam who had come from India and had been
living in Manhattan for 10 years. Yet in a sense, he had never left India. In the dis-
cussion, he expressed opinions that were beyond belief and painted a negative
image of Islam. Yet, one could also sense that his frustrations were caused by his
inability to deal with American society. And he was passing these frustrations to his
congregations in the mosque and was projecting them to the U.S. public on televi-
sion. Given such inadequate representatives, what views can the average American
form of Islam?

Consequently, the tendency to see these communities as places for politicization
has led to surveillance and to deep concerns about what is going on in mosques. I
have talked to government officials in Europe and to people in the United States.
The question is not just whether surveillance is taking place, but also whether it
should take place. There is a level of surveillance that did not exist in the case of
Roman Catholic churches, in New England, which supported the IRA. So there is
an ability to talk about surveillance of mosques, and there is an ability to talk about
other measures that simply did not exist in regard to some other communities.

These attitudes are strengthened by the fact that there are real problems and
threats. There are mosques that have been involved in subversive and terrorist acts.
Sheik Omar Abdurahman is a perfect example of such harsh realities. My and my
wife’s parents have lived seven blocks from each other for years, and there is a no-
man’s-land between the two in Jersey City, N.J. When we would go by the no-
man’s-land, I would see this big storage place, and I would say to my wife, “Why
does anybody need this storage? Who’s going to store anything there?” But that’s
where those that bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 stored everything. And
Omar Abdurahman had one of his mosques right up the block from where my par-
ents lived. In the Jersey City that existed in my parents’ consciousness, this was
impossible, beyond belief.

The extent to which such incidents occur in the United States or in Europe, and
considering the fact that these incidents occur within a broader context in which
Islam as a religion and the majority Muslim experience are not well understood,
leads to the equating of the experience of a militant minority with that of the entire
community. Therefore, all negative and fearful ideas become believable. A double
standard is allowed to exist, and it raises the question whether Muslims can ever
become part of Western societies. Indeed, one reporter who was doing a story on
Muslims in the United States asked me: “Do you think that they will ever be able to
become part of the American scene?” “They.” He saw Islam as antithetical to what-
Muslims are getting contradictory messages from their own leaders and from broader society in terms of their relations to Europe and the United States. A minority of Muslims has imams who encourage them to return “home.” Another minority has imams who encourage them not to cooperate with the rest of society: “Live in America,” they counsel, “but don’t get involved because you are not really part of this broader community. Don’t vote.” Meanwhile, a significant number of Muslims have chosen to build strong institutions, to become more institutionalized in their societies. The emergence of groups like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the American Muslim Council (AMC), which are struggling to gain some presence and influence, express the desire of many Muslims to join the mainstream of American society and politics. Indeed, in a short period, CAIR and AMC have achieved much. Yet as they become more prominent, they face new challenges. For example, former first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton gave an iftar reception at the White House and invited representatives of the Muslim community. Shortly afterward, she was attacked in an article that appeared in the Wall Street Journal for having “invited terrorists to dinner,” which also basically delegitimized these organizations. The next year, she invited a different Muslim organization from the West Coast, and the same kind of story came out. This raises the question of what kind of message mainstream Muslims are receiving from society? Basically, that they are suspect.

The Muslims’ situation is worsened by the activities of extremist groups. Groups like Hizb-ul-Tahir and Al-Muhajiroun, although small and few in number, are vocal. Their words and actions, either within the country or on the Internet, are expressing hostile views toward the West or, more seriously, are being disruptive and subversive. For those who are seeking to put Muslims in a negative light, they provide ample ammunition. All one has to do is to print out some of the material that Al-Muhajiroun puts out, from its offices in Maryland or in Britain. Similarly, some of the material Hizb-ul-Tahir puts out about the United States and Europe in effect portrays the West as a society of kufur (unbelief), “anti-Islamic societies that ought to be overthrown,” or advocates the creation of Islamic states in America and Europe. Since there is no proper context for judging the relative impact of these statements, they come to be seen as representing mainstream Islam and Muslims. I think this situation complicates the issues related to the Muslim presence in Europe and the United States and the response of indigenous societies.

Besides the issue of the statements and activities of the extremist minority, a number of other problems continue to bedevil Muslim communities and their relations to the majority society, despite recent Muslim gains in terms of acceptance and legitimacy. One such issue is that of hijab (veil), which is controversial not only in France but also in the United States and Canada. Hijab is not only viewed as the symbol of Islam but also of a politicized and even combative Islam, and hence it is seen as a kind of political threat. Thus wearing hijab by Muslim women is not seen in the same light as Jews wearing the yarmulke or Sikhs wearing the turban or
Christians wearing a cross that can be seen. Rather, it is perceived as a political act and not mere religious observance. I have a colleague from Turkey who wears a hijab. She often talks about her frustrations as a Turkish woman in Turkey (and I would argue even outside of Turkey), because, although she is not an Islamist and is not involved in any political party, she is immediately associated with a political profile considered as threatening because she wears the hijab.

I used to think that attitudes toward this issue were more advanced in the United States and Canada. But research into the kind of reasoning that is going on in the courts shows that, in North America, too, people are struggling with the issue of hijab.

**Impact of External Actors**

The involvement of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Gulf Arab states with Muslim communities in Europe and the United States, by providing financial and other support largely with the goal of promoting their particular interpretation of Islam, further complicate the situation. First, such efforts become divisive within the Islamic communities. Moreover, certain interpretations of Islam, such as Wahhabism, often tend to encourage Muslim communities to separate themselves from the rest of society. Again, separatist groups tend to be more vocal. Therefore, their message tends to obscure the reality of most Muslims who, in fact, are concerned with or are working to become full players within the broader society and are trying to deal constructively with issues of integration and what it means to be a permanent minority in Europe and the United States, as Muslims have been in other parts of the world for centuries.

**Information Superhighway**

Not all interaction between European and American Muslim communities with other Muslims is of a negative nature, however. There are positive aspects to it. One is what I call the information superhighway that now exists between these communities and other Muslims. The flow of information and personnel is not just from Muslim countries to Europe and the United States. Rather, the exchange of ideas and even personnel now moves in both directions.

In fact, some of the freest, most creative thinking regarding Islam and Muslims is taking place in the United States and in Europe, and it is likely to remain so in the future. Indeed, many of the next generation of teachers are being trained in the United States and Europe and will be going back to their home countries. We already see the impact of certain Muslim scholars and personalities, whose writings in English are now being translated into various languages of the Muslim world, and their students are going back to their countries and playing roles there.
Similarly, the works of Muslim scholars in their own countries are flowing to Europe and the United States.

To sum up, both Muslim communities and Western societies are facing serious challenges in terms of mutual accommodation. But there are also positive signs.
How Many Muslims in Europe?

For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to accurately estimate the number of Muslims in Europe. For example, in the national census of most European countries, ethnic and religious affiliation is not identified. Furthermore, those Muslims who have been born in their country of residence or have acquired the citizenship of that country are not included in the number of Muslims. Therefore, there are various estimates of Muslims, ranging from 9 to 15 million. I will use the 9-million figure, which does not include Muslims in Eastern Europe. Even the 9-million figure makes the Muslims the largest religious minority in Europe and Islam the third-largest religion on the Continent. Moreover, in most countries it is growing much faster than the historically dominant religions—Catholicism and Protestantism. If the 9-million figure is accepted, then Muslims represent 3 percent of Europe’s total population.

Geographic Distribution

Europe’s Muslim population is not evenly distributed, however. Rather, it is concentrated in six countries. France has the largest Muslim population, about 5 million. Next is Germany with about 2 million, followed by the United Kingdom with 1.5 million, the Netherlands with 500,000, Belgium with 300,000, and Austria with 200,000. The heavy concentration of Muslims in these countries is not surprising, because in the last three decades they have experienced massive labor migrations. Muslim populations also exist in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden,
Denmark, Norway) and in Italy and Spain. These populations are of more recent origin, especially in the south, since historically Italy and Spain were labor-exporting countries.

**Ethnic Composition**

Europe’s Muslim population is ethnically diverse. The largest group consists of Arabs, especially North Africans. The second-largest group consists of Turks, although some of these so-called Turks are ethnic Kurds originating from Turkey. Although the Turkish presence is generally identified with Germany, Turks are also present in most European countries, albeit at difference levels of concentration. The third-largest group of Muslims in Europe consists of those originating in the Indian subcontinent, especially Pakistan.

**Sociocultural Context of Islam’s Presence in Europe**

To understand the social and cultural context within which Europe’s Muslims operate, it is essential to point out that they are a post-colonial group. In other words, Muslims living in the main European countries come from countries that were once the colonies of those host countries or had special relationships with them. France was the colonial power in North Africa, the UK in Asia, and Germany had special ties with Turkey. Although generally, Germany is not considered a colonial country (except in parts of Africa), it did have a close relationship with the Ottoman Empire.

What this means is that there is a shared memory on both sides, which is based on inequality—dominant and dominated. This legacy puts heavy pressure on Europe’s Muslims because it is very difficult for Europeans—for some it is even painful—to accept that they once dominated people who now should be treated as equals. The most paradigmatic example of this psychological and cultural context is France and its relationship with North Africa. It is very difficult for some French citizens to accept that these people, who were once colonized by France and fought against France in order to become independent, are now to be treated as equal citizens.

The second aspect of this context is the perception of Islam as a threat, although there are different visions of how this threat can be actualized. For example, until recently in France, there was great fear that young, poor Muslims living in French housing projects or in very marginalized housing projects would be tempted to join the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria (FIS). In other words, the terrorist threat in the minds of people was linked to the political situation in Algeria. At the end of the 1990s, France witnessed the Khaled Kilkal syndrome. Kilkal was a French citizen with an Algerian background, born and raised in Lyon or the outskirts of Lyon, who became a chief suspect in a terrorist bombing campaign in 1995. This caused great concern. French citizens asked themselves how these people who were born, raised,
and educated in France could point their weapons at them? How and why did such incidents happen? This mentality is gradually changing, and major segments of French society are finally accepting, slowly but surely, the legitimacy of young people with Islamic and North African roots.

The British situation is different. On the one hand, there is the antiterrorist legislation, and on the other hand, the British are the ones who coined the term Islamophobia. In 1997, there was a very famous report by the Runnymede Foundation, which is now quoted by everyone on Islamophobia. This report tried to take an inventory of various kinds of discrimination faced by Muslims in British society.

In Germany in 1997, a controversial academic book by Wilhelm Heitmeyer was published, which caused major debate in German society. The book approached the question of Turkish Muslims within a theoretical framework that was inspired by the analysis of the neo-Nazi movement in Germany and the youth violence associated with it. The implicit assertion of the book was that if you were a young Turk living in Germany you were susceptible to violence. In general, in Germany there is a tendency to reject Muslims or to place them outside of the national and cultural debates, even if these Muslims speak fluent German. As an example, thus far there is only one member of the German Bundestag who is of Turkish origin.

In short, it is not easy to be a Muslim in Europe with a different national and cultural background from the rest of the population. The European vision of Muslims that produces this effect derives from three major misperceptions. First, many Europeans neglect the important changes that have been taking place within those Muslims who are part of the generation born or educated in Europe. This is because Muslims always seem to be viewed in relation to major international issues, terrorism, or political threats overseas. This makes it impossible to see them living and adapting and changing in an anonymous way and undergoing what I used to call the “silent revolution.” Thus the fact that Muslims are changing, adapting, adopting new ways, facing new questions, is often totally neglected and is hidden under the heavy political debate on the question of the Muslim threat and the postcolonial condition.

The second major misperception derives from the fact, both at the political level and sometimes even at the intellectual level, that Islam is dealt with as a monolith. In other words, European publics generally do not pay much attention to the Muslims’ ethnic origins, but see all of them, from Indonesia, Morocco, or Turkey, as just part of a single entity, namely Islam. Yet from a sociological point of view, it is difficult to talk of a Muslim community in Western Europe because of the diversity and complexity of the community.

The third misperception derives from juxtaposing Islam and modernity. For many Europeans, a Muslim cannot be a modern person. Rather, he or she is in some ways backward or conservative at best and radical at worst, rejecting all the

2. Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Joachim Müller, Helmut Schröder, Verlockender Fundamentalismus: Türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997).
outcomes and benefits of modernity. The debate about the relationship between Islam and modernity is significant because a similar debate is underway in the Muslim world itself, and these two become interconnected.

**Principal Features of Islam in Europe**

The first point to be noted is the greater visibility of Islam in Europe. In the last two decades, Muslims have managed to establish religious communities and to assert their identity in a more visible, public, and to some degree, controversial manner. By the end of the 1960s and 1970s, there was a large-scale establishment of Muslim places of worship and institutions throughout Europe. But these establishments also served as centers where Muslims could create some cohesion among people of different generations, different social and economic status and background.

This movement began as a result of solidarity among people at the local level. Yet, often their emergence was linked to external connections. It was said that these communities obtained financial aid from Libya, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt. Moreover, their emergence was linked to the rise of political Islam overseas. Yet this was not true because these communities developed and became more visible in Europe before the explosion of political Islam on the international scene.

This is not to suggest that there is no connection between the two phenomena or between Muslim communities and Muslim states. Such connections do exist, but people are not as easily manipulated as is often believed. It is too easy to think that, because they get help from Muslim countries, they become puppets or follow their dogmas. The relationship between the two is more complex. The places of worship and other community centers are organized along ethnic lines, and Islam is often used to assert ethnic identity. The fact that, in the same neighborhood, there is a Turkish mosque and an Arab mosque supports this view. In fact, this diversity is not related to differences in religious beliefs or ritual. It is because local religious communities serve to reinforce ethnic boundaries and membership. But the situation is beginning to change, and there is a great degree of ethnic mixing in some places of worship, which is due to the emergence of a new generation of religious leaders. This new leadership refuses to be affiliated with or be submitted to only one ethnic group.

I recall interviewing a young man in a suburb in France, who told me, “I don’t want a mosque for North Africans. I want a mosque for Muslims.” By this he meant that, if his neighbor from Turkey wanted to come to his mosque, he was welcome, and that this is what Muslims needed.

This ethnic diversity of Muslim places of worship creates opportunities for their political manipulation by major Muslim states within the European space. In this respect, Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey are particularly active. They want to shape the character and operation of Islamic organizations and the nature of their relationship with different European states. Also, these countries try to use their
European Islam

communities to get advantages from the European countries. The Moroccans and Algerians tried to do this during the 1995 Barcelona Conference on the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue.

The question of how to transmit Islamic principles and values to a new generation of Muslims who have been born, educated, and married in Western Europe is very much preoccupying European Muslims and the European governments. Thus the issue of Islamic schools and the training of imams is of great importance and concern to both actors.

Last but not least, there is the gradual emergence of an indigenous European Islam. One aspect of this phenomenon is the organization of religious activity in the vernacular, such as English, French, or Dutch. The other aspect is the emergence of new generations who don’t want to be submitted to specific national versions of Islam practiced overseas and are trying to create conditions for development of a specifically European Islam suited to the particular situations of the countries in which they live. They do not want to become completely secularized and to abandon Islam. Rather, they want to legitimize Islam’s presence in the social and public spheres. But their efforts to do so in a context where religions, or at least some of them, are completely delegitimized in the public space creates misunderstandings between the Europeans and young Muslims.
Islam first came to the Iberian Peninsula after 711 A.D. The part of the peninsula that fell to Muslim armies was called Al-Andalus, and its size varied according to the vicissitudes of recurring wars. The Arab-Islamic presence lasted for several centuries and left a significant imprint, albeit to varying degrees, on the people of the Iberian Peninsula and on their way of life and culture.

By the first half of the thirteenth century—when the Portuguese conquered the Algarve (1250) and Fernando III the Holy, King of Leon and Castille, took control of Cordova (1236) and Seville (1248)—the Christian Reconquest was nearly complete. Muslim rule was limited to the small kingdom of Grenada, and it fell in 1492. During this period, between the fall of most Muslim kingdoms and that of Grenada, there were no wars of a magnitude that could alter the course of civilization of the two countries—Portugal and Spain—which shared the Iberian Peninsula. The long Islamic history of Al-Andalus and the culture that developed there had major consequences for other regions, in addition to the Iberian Peninsula, which were subject to Arab and Islamic influences.

Different Patterns of Islamicization

The religio-cultural impact of Arab-Islamic expansion in the Iberian Peninsula and in territories to the east took different forms. In some areas, most of the indigenous peoples were Arabized. In other areas, most were only Islamized, and still others, while culturally Arabized, retained their religions. Thus in the Eastern part of the Arab World (Mashreq), numerous Christians remained faithful to their religion. In the greater Maghreb, comprising Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, the whole population converted to Islam, but numerous Berbers (almost 50 percent in Morocco) still retained their ancestral cultural values and language.
The varying patterns of Arab domination in the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula also had considerable cultural ramifications. North Africa saw the advent of successive waves of Sunni, Kharejite, and Shi'ite Muslims. Meanwhile, Al-Andalus was ruled by the Sunni Umayyad dynasty, which lasted until the tenth century. The Umayyads were not much interested in Islamic proselytization among the inhabitants of the peninsula. Rather, they contented themselves with submission to Al-Andalus’s political, military, and administrative rule. Indeed, Arabization was more intense and more extensive than Islamization. When the mystic Muslim movements (Sufism) arose during the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Christian Reconquest was already under way, and Latinization and Christianization overcame Muslim/Arab power. Thus the Iberian Peninsula became part of the Domus Dei (House of God), and the Maghreb remained part of Dar ul-Islam (Domain of Peace).

**Deepening Divide**

The centuries that followed the Christian Reconquest and, above all, the conversion of the Turks to Islam, solidified the divide between Christian lands and peoples and the Islamic world. Gradually, barriers to understanding between the two cultures and religions emerged—barriers that were reinforced by the Inquisition and aspects of Turkish military and administrative apparatus. Yet, some level of communication was maintained, although at a low level.

**Colonial Expansion of Spain and Portugal**

During the period of their colonial expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, both Spain and Portugal came into conflict with Muslims peoples and states. The Portuguese frequently battled the Muslims in East and Northeast Africa, South Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Spanish, meanwhile, fought against the Arabs and the Turks in the Mediterranean and North Africa. When the Iberian crowns were united under the scepter of Philip II, Philip III, and Philip IV (1580–1640), the break with the Peninsula’s Islamic past became complete, and Catholicism was fully established. During the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the divide between the two civilizations deepened, while at the same time, Europe’s economic, political, and military power dramatically increased.

This shift in power enabled the Europeans to establish their supremacy over the Muslim peoples of Africa and Asia and to colonize a large part of the Islamic world. Spain claimed parts of Morocco from France, with a view to establishing a protectorate. It finally succeeded in doing so in the regions of Riff, Ifni, and Sahara (1912). Despite a few defeats, such as the Battle of Anonal (1921), Spanish colonization in Morocco came to an end only in 1956 with the country’s independence, and in Sahara in 1975, following the “Green March” directed by King Hassan II.
During the Spanish domination over North Africa, a considerable number of Muslims learned Spanish and became acquainted with Western civilization. Upon independence, some citizens—especially those from Morocco—sought to become integrated into Spanish society and life. In most cases, these people possessed average to high levels of education and were able to overcome the obstacles that were natural during transition to a society that possessed different values. During this early period, the number of Muslim immigrants was low, and it was relatively easy for them to integrate into the majority societies.

Increasing Muslim Presence in Spain

Spain’s economic development in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s led to a sharp increase in the number of immigrant workers from Muslim countries. These workers, however, found it difficult to adapt their traditional habits and values to those of the host country. Meanwhile, a large number of Spanish reacted negatively to this influx because they did not want to see changes in Spanish customs—some of the most marked and distinct in the world. Besides immigrant workers from the Maghreb, Spain also became a destination for a significant number of Arabs from the Middle East and Egypt, who were interested in getting to know both Western culture and Spain, which contains the monumental remains of Al-Andalus and traces of the magnificent civilization of its Islamic past. These traces can still be seen in numerous literary works, architectural jewels, a vast bibliography, and a variety of other forms, ranging from numismatics to epigraphy, toponymy, cuisine, and traditional folk tales.

Spain also became a financial center with the ability to absorb the large amounts of cash that were available to some Muslim countries and individuals, who were looking for a safe and profitable place to invest. Some of these investments attracted public attention and generated interest and even a favorable opinion of Islam and Muslims in parts of Spanish society. Some Muslim countries did not resist the opportunity to engage in proselytization, which led to the conversion to Islam of both Spaniards and other citizens living in the country. Together with the existing Muslims and their descendants, these converts formed some substantial communities that built mosques—many of which have Islamic schools (madrasas) attached to them—restored ancient Arab monuments, and disseminated both Arab culture and the Muslim religion. Universities expanded the teaching of the Arabic language and Muslim history and civilization, works on Arab and Islamic themes were published, and an Islamic university was founded in Cordova.

In recent years, the number of Arab immigrants, especially from the Maghreb, has reached very high levels. This immigration has generated conflicts with local populations. But these conflicts are attenuated by Spain’s need for manpower, which stems partly from its falling birth rate.
Muslims in Portugal

The situation of Islam and Muslims in Portugal has been substantially different from that in Spain. During the twentieth century, Portugal’s contact with Muslim peoples mainly involved the populations of Guinea Bissau and Mozambique. Until the 1960s, few people from these countries ever came to Europe. In Guinea Bissau, two ethnic groups are heavily Islamized: the Fulas and the Mandingas. These groups lived in the heart of the country because the Islamization process had taken place via commercial routes that traversed the interior. It was primarily conducted by Muslim religious brotherhoods, which, without making great doctrinal demands, attracted people, thanks to the simplicity of their liturgies, the acceptance of traditional practices, and the prestige of their civilization. Confrontations, including theoretical arguments, with Christian missionaries often led to the Muslims’ defeat, whereupon they took refuge among those Muslims who were more closely linked to the African rural and trading worlds. In 1940, less than 40 percent of the black population was Muslim, but by the time of independence in 1974, Islam claimed the loyalty of at least 70 percent of the people.

Portugal first began to receive immigrants from Guinea Bissau after the latter’s independence in 1974, but due to the improvement in the Portuguese economic situation and the degradation of living conditions in Guinea, the number of immigrants has been increasing ever since. Most immigrants from Guinea Bissau are Sunni Muslims, but among them are also many Christians and a few followers of traditional religions.

Even before the change in Portuguese politics in 1974, a number of Mozambican Muslims also came to Europe to study or work. Most came from the northern part of Mozambique, especially from the island of the same name. They tended to settle in Lisbon and other urban centers. The Muslims who came from Mozambique mostly belonged to the Ajauas and the Macuas. In Mozambique, these groups live in a patchwork pattern alongside others with different religious faiths. Unlike Guinea Bissau, where Islamization occurred via land-based trading routes, in Mozambique and East Africa the process took place via the sea. Muslim Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula and the coastal regions of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf sailed along the coasts of Africa in search of slaves, ivory, and gold from Monomotapa (Zimbabwe), as well as other products that they exchanged for cloth and manufactured goods. The Muslim brotherhoods played an important role in these parts of Africa. Their members were often trading agents whose loyalty to their Arab masters was heightened by their religious conversion.

Muslims from Mozambique were behind the creation of the Lisbon Islamic Community in 1968. Its first president was Dr. Suleiman Valy Mamede, who was born on the Island of Mozambique. From the moment of its foundation, the Lisbon Islamic Community sought to build a mosque and to create the conditions needed to ensure the practice of the traditional Islamic way of life. The right to engage in the ritual slaughter of animals was obtained without difficulty, as was the tasmiya or ceremony at which newborn children are given their names.
The change in political conditions following the 1974 revolution facilitated the satisfaction of the Muslim community’s requests. The Lisbon Municipal Authority gave the community a plot of land near the Praça de Espanha, on which, many centuries after the Reconquest, the first Islamic place of worship was built. A number of Arab countries covered the cost of the building, which includes a Koranic school and a social center. Over the last few decades, Portugal’s Muslim population has increased significantly and currently numbers around 40,000 people.

Besides the traditional sources—Mozambique and Guinea Bissau—many other countries have contributed to the flow of immigrants, including Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and some countries in West Africa, including Senegal and Nigeria. There are also Muslims from Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq. They choose Portugal for reasons that involve study, work, and investment opportunities. The financial investment motives became more important after Portugal joined the European Community. The great majority of African and Arab Muslims are Sunnis and come together at the Lisbon Mosque or the other mosques that have been opened in the suburbs of the capital (such as the one in Laranjeiro) and in other cities like Oporto. There is a school for Muslim children in Palmela. Portugal is also home to the second-largest Ismaili (Sevener Shi’a) community in Europe (after that in the United Kingdom).

Under the spiritual leadership of the Aga Khan, the 6,000 to 7,000 Portuguese Ismailis form a group that generally works in the retail trade. They have become an important force in the furniture and hotel industries, as well as in electric goods and in the running of shopping centers and public facilities, such as cinemas. The Lisbon Ismaili Cultural Centre is located next to the Catholic University and Santa Maria Hospital. It contains a hall of worship, a library, classrooms, meeting and party rooms, and a youth and social assistance section.

Conclusions

In a few decades, Islam has acquired an important presence in Spain and a considerable one in Portugal. Most Muslims are of African origin, although there are some from Asia. In economic terms, most are immigrant workers with little education or technical training. Although numerically small, parts of the Arab and Ismaili populations possess a noteworthy financial capacity. The Sunni Muslims are intermixing with other ethnic groups, although mixed marriages are not as frequent as intra-community ones. Muslims’ religious beliefs are not always suited to the secularism of Western societies—or worse, to the indifference that is common in many social groups that are solely concerned with economic gain or sporting prowess. Obligations such as prayer, the giving of alms, and the Ramadan fast are regularly and even enthusiastically fulfilled. Love for one’s family, caring for children, and life in common within one’s social group continue to be essential values for Muslims.

Muslims living in Spain and Portugal are striving to raise their social status and improve their living conditions. In cultural and social terms, they are finding it difficult to maintain a balance between preserving ancestral values and fulfilling
religious obligations and beliefs on the one hand, and adapting to the demands of modern liberal societies on the other. Overcoming this dichotomy is an essential condition for success in the integration of Muslim communities and harmonious development of modern societies that are multicultural and, as such, are necessarily tolerant, although also demanding in areas where the citizens’ fulfillment of civic duties and obligations is concerned.
In recent years, there has been a tendency within the sociological analysis of Muslim youth in Europe and North America to distinguish between alienating tendencies, integrating tendencies, secularizing tendencies, and religiosity, as if all of these were sharply dichotomized categories. Yet, in reality, these are false dichotomies, and all the above-noted processes occur simultaneously. In many ways, in fact, they are often two sides of the same coin. To frame the situation in this way is to ignore the more fluid and nuanced forms of youth identity that are to be found within Muslim communities in Europe. In fact, Muslim youth culture is notable for the way in which it defies easy categories, such as secular and religious.

In discussing the process of identity formation among Muslim youth and the overlapping phenomena of alienation and integration, two developments are worth noting at the outset: (1) the development of what might be called a European Islam; and (2) the rise of what might be termed “critical Islam.” The latter refers to the reconceptualization of Islam that comes from living in the West and facing specific issues that arise from one’s status as a minority.

Another aspect worth mentioning is that living in the West can and should be viewed as an empowering experience. This means that Muslims should see living in the West as a condition that empowers them to think about issues that previously were not available to them, because certain discussion spaces were closed when they lived in the Muslim world (e.g., the media or various state-society channels).

Phases of Muslim Youth Development in Europe

The 1980s were a particularly difficult time for Muslim youth. This was the decade that we might call the “dark ‘80s,” a period when a majority of the European Muslim (and, more particularly, South Asian) population was living in Margaret Thatcher’s very conservative Britain. And it was there that the socioeconomic disenfranchisement of Muslim youth became heavily pronounced. This was also the
height of Islamophobia in Britain. During this period, there arose a climate which put great social pressure on young Muslims either to reject Islam, that is to turn away from those elements of their identity that led them to not fit in, or to turn to Islam as a vehicle of socioeconomic protest and as a remedy for alienation from the wider society.

The reaction to the affair over Salman Rushdie’s controversial book, The Satanic Verses, can best be understood in this context. I recall talking to several young Muslims a few years ago, and they told me that before the Rushdie affair, Islam had not figured heavily in their lives. But when this book came out, given with the reaction to it, especially the inability of mainstream British society to understand why Muslims might have complaints against it, it became a symbol of the alienation, misrepresentation, and misunderstanding of South Asian communities within the United Kingdom. These young Muslims told me that suddenly they found themselves marching in front of a line, defending Islam against this book, when in fact, religion had never really been a large part of their lives.

It is in light of such examples that I believe the distinctions between secularizing and religious, alienating, and integrating processes are somewhat false. Rather, one must look at specific sociopolitical moments and circumstances, in order to understand the conditions under which Islam becomes politicized.

The 1990s: Relative Improvement

By the mid-1990s, conditions began to improve: the worst of Islamophobia was certainly over in the United Kingdom. There was a much wider discursive landscape in which Islam was able to speak and be heard publicly, and this was a very positive development. This decade also witnessed a large increase in the number of young Muslims. In Britain, the number of citizens of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent almost doubled between 1981 and 1991, of which half were born in the United Kingdom.

The age disparity between the South Asian and indigenous populations in Britain is also striking; there are almost twice as many youth under 16 among South Asians as there are in the majority white population. Only 2 percent of the South Asian community is over 65, while the rate for the indigenous population is 17 percent. I observe this demographic pattern—albeit with certain inevitable variations—throughout other West European countries. These demographic realities mean that Islam’s future in Europe is quite literally in the hands of its youth. Given this fact, a question of vital importance arises: What is the character of this “youth Islam”? What does Islam mean to Muslim youth in the West? And, from the standpoint of these young Muslims, from whom can reliable knowledge about Islam be gained in order to start addressing questions that animate conversations within Muslim communities?

Nature of Intra-Muslim Youth Interaction

Such conversations are intensified in Western diaspora contexts due to the sheer volume of human traffic that flows through them. Muslims in Europe come face to face with the myriad shapes and colors of what one might call a global Islam. Turks meet Egyptians in Vienna; Bangladeshis study alongside Indonesians in London. Now these encounters often play an important role in the processes of identity formation, prompting young Muslims to compare their understandings of Islam with those of other Muslims. Consequently, within this new generation, there is a trend toward communication and interaction across sectarian and ethnic boundaries. In this sense, the process of globalization is enriching intra-Muslim discourse. In fact, there is a dual process underway. On the one hand, globalization, transnationalism, and the arrival of Muslims of diverse and many backgrounds in globalized cities, such as London, mean that Muslims, perhaps for the first time in centuries, glimpse the reality of living the idea of the Islamic ummah, a global community of believers in which ethnic and sectarian differences do not matter (or at least matter less).

Meanwhile, this same process is forcing Islam to reconcile itself to its internal diversity. The fact of the existence of diverse and, at times, competing and contradictory interpretations of Islam in Europe and the process of reconciling and resolving these differences, moving toward synthesis, is one of the hallmarks of emerging European Islam. It is this aspect that makes Islam in Europe a creative intellectual force.

Intergenerational differences and problems confronting Muslim youth are among the dynamics that are defining Europe’s Muslim youth culture. Many young Muslims often reject the Islam of their parents because they see this Islam as being heavily imbued with a sense of the homeland from which they migrated in the 1960s or 1970s.

The new generation sees this Islam as very localized and narrow minded, an Islam of the villages. The younger generation points out that their parents are not really engaged with the problems that they face as Muslim youth growing up in the West. What the parents are concerned with is either Pakistani politics or what their children see as trivial debates regarding which school of jurisprudence (madhab) and which interpretations of the shari’a should be applied to regulate life and resolve problems. The young generation feels that these debates are not helping them, and they point to the need for a universal approach. This is an approach suited to the reality of living in the West that embraces the true Islam. Therefore, the youth often turn away from their parents’ Islam, which they see as ethnically determined and parochial, and they search for a more universalist or, in their eyes, a more “true” Islam.

One aspect of this turning away is the inability of many young Muslims to relate to imams who come from their home countries. Often, they literally cannot speak the same language; for example, for many young South Asian Muslims in Britain today, Urdu is a second language (if indeed they speak it at all).
The result of this intergenerational divide has been the establishment of many Muslim youth organizations and associations in the UK in recent years, which is viewed as a major and positive development by most Muslim youth. These are groups that have been set up by young Muslims who mostly have been born and raised in the UK.

These institutions are one part of the process of developing an interpretation and understanding of Islam that is specifically designed to answer the needs of young Muslims living in the West. One such group is Young Muslims UK, which is very popular with Muslim youth, particularly those of South Asian decent. In the United Kingdom, one young Muslim told me that he felt the need to rediscover his religion, but any time he went to the mosque and asked questions of the imams, he never received a satisfactory response. Imams would tell him, “Don't ask too many questions... your questions are problematic... just be quiet.” He added that, when he went to meetings of Young Muslims UK, he discovered that the questions he was posing had also been in the minds of others. As he put it, “I wanted to move toward Islam, but I needed an Islam that would speak to me, to my problems, to the situations that I face today.”

It is within groups such as Young Muslims UK that answers to questions such as these are to be found, not in the mosques or mosque organizations that are still dominated by the older generations. It is in such organizations that Muslim youth find an Islam spoken in a familiar language, not only linguistically but in terms relevant to popular culture and capable of integrating popular British culture with Islam. Moreover, in these organizations, there is a tendency to play down sectarian differences and as much as possible to base understanding of Islam on the most universally agreed-upon sources, such as the Qur'an, or the most widely accepted books of Hadith, and to use them as the basis for their European Islam.

Another important aspect of this youth Islam is a significant increase in print and other forms of media, which are very much oriented toward British youth popular culture—often using the symbols and imagery of that culture in order to articulate an Islam that resonates and makes sense to young Muslims. There is, for example, a television show called *Adam’s World*, an Islamic version of *Sesame Street*, where Jim Henson–style muppets are used to teach Muslim culture and values to the children. The Internet is another forum where different interpretations of Islam, which were previously prohibited, can be discussed.

**The Character of Political Activism among Muslim Youth**

Often, different tendencies among Muslim youth are translated into social or political activism. Some of this activism is of a radical nature and subversive of the existing order. A principal representative of this trend in the 1990s in Britain was Hizb-ul-Tahir. This group claimed that, by the early twenty-first century, they would establish an Islamic state in the UK and recreate the Caliphate. Interestingly
these utopian, extremist, and in the eyes of many young Muslims, preposterous views served as rallying cries for the more disenfranchised elements of Muslim youth who wanted to take as strong an anti-Western line as possible. The group moved to the UK because its goals were seen as ridiculous in the Middle East. No one took them seriously. Realizing that many young Muslims living in the West have a weaker understanding of Islam, they tried to lure them with populist anti-Western slogans. The group’s activism led to a greater politicization of Islam in the UK, and even those groups that had not been interested in the political dimensions of Islam were forced to respond. We might even say that this movement’s activities had a unifying effect within the Muslim communities, since those tendencies within Muslim youth culture that were against the views of Hizb-ul-Tahir (and this was most of them) were able to unite in the face of this common “enemy” within Islam itself.

The problem, however, is that, because of the Western media’s coverage of Islam, it is still groups such as Hizb-ul-Tahir, and its contemporary spin-off, Al-Muhajiroun that attract the headlines because they fit the cognitive framework that the Western media have devised for Islam. Through their vocal militancy and intolerance, they confirm the stereotypes and commonly held assumptions. Unfortunately, they also attract all the attention; whereas, those interpretations of Islam that condemn Hizb-ul-Tahir or similar groups receive significantly less coverage because they don’t fit the “conventional wisdom” about Islam. But whose conventional wisdom, we have to ask ourselves, is this? What are its sources? Does it really bear any resemblance to the beliefs of the vast majority of Muslims in Europe (or the world, for that matter)?

Conclusions

The great majority of Muslim youth see themselves as stakeholders in European society. For them, the fate of European Islam is tied to the fate of Europe itself. Therefore, participation, cooperation, and dialogue are very much the operative themes for them. For many, being in the West is an advantageous position because it is a place where new interpretations and new understandings of Islam can be articulated. We might conclude with an illustrative anecdote. Within classic Islamic political theory there is a division between dar-ul-Islam (“the domain of Islam”) and dar-ul-Harb (“the domain of war”)—in other words, very sharply dichotomized conceptions of Muslim and non-Muslim worlds. Yet at a recent seminar in France, a group of mainly young ulama decided that Europe, certainly Western Europe, cannot any longer be considered as dar-ul-Harb because there are too many Muslims who are becoming European (while remaining thoroughly Muslim) and are successfully integrating themselves into European societies. Thus the challenge for them was actually to understand and redefine Europe. And they accomplished this by deciding that Europe is now dar-ul-Ahd—the “domain of treaty” or unity. This is a term that implies a certain degree of social and civic responsibility. It is not a concept based on an “us” versus “them” mentality. Rather,
it is a view that says Muslims live in Europe and are an integral part of its social fabric. This is, at least from my perspective, the dominant trend, and it is becoming amplified as we move into the twenty-first century.
Before discussing the question of the concerns and aspirations of European Muslims, it is important to define whom we mean by the term “Muslim.” That is, we must define who is a Muslim.

What Criteria Define a Muslim?

The question of what criteria to use to define who is a Muslim is delicate, and not everyone agrees. Are conviction and religious observance the main criteria? Is it culture—a sense of belonging to Islamic culture—that is more appropriate? Or is it that anyone who is born Muslim is a Muslim? I believe it is necessary from the outset to differentiate various categories of Muslims in Europe and to be specific about who the Muslims are we are talking about. If the definition is accepted that every man or woman who feels Muslim is a Muslim, then there would be a basis for discussion. I want to stress here that Imam Shafei was of this opinion. In his discussions with Imam Ahmad Hanbal, he stressed that being Muslim is not dependent on observance or even praying. Rather, whoever tells the shihada, acknowledging the oneness of God and the prophetic mission of Muhammad, is a Muslim. However, even if this definition is accepted, is it possible to speak about all Muslims without differentiating between the so-called Muslims-by-culture and the practicing Muslims?

Therefore, when speaking about Muslim concerns in Europe, I have to be clear about what I have in mind. Sometimes people ask me whom I represent. All the Muslims? I have to answer “No.” Today, I will speak about the aspirations of a minority of Muslims living in Europe, namely those whom I call the “concerned Muslims.” This has to be clear also because of the fact that these issues are discussed within the Muslim communities, themselves.
Different Categories of Muslims

The great majority of Muslims in Europe are not strict practicing Muslims. This fact has to be acknowledged. It has also to be admitted that, for this great majority of Muslims, their principal concerns are exactly the same as the indigenous Europeans: namely, employment, good salaries, and a better standard of living. These issues are discussed among Muslims, themselves, in Europe and in the United States.

Yet it must also be noted that the visible revival of Islam and the appearance of new awareness among Muslims in Europe has already had a great spiritual impact on the silent and nonvisible majority of Muslims. This new awareness is reflected in the large number of Muslims who want to gain a better understanding of their faith. For example, last Ramadan, throughout Europe—in France, Britain, Germany, and other countries—there were large crowds in the mosques. This new awareness will have a great influence, as well, on the silent majority in the future. Indeed, this is why we are discussing the question of Muslims in Europe and the United States. If we were to discuss only the small minority of practicing Muslims, there would be no point to it.

The role of young Muslims was emphasized here and how they are influencing the Muslim communities. I do not quite agree with this interpretation. These youth are not so young, they are already part of European societies, and they should be considered as “Muslims living in Europe.” They are mature now, and they will build the future, especially within Muslim organizations. They are trying to find a way in Europe, but they are a minority. Nevertheless, they have and will have a great influence in the overall community.

The other important point to be stressed is that, among practicing Muslims and their organizations in Europe, there is a great deal of diversity. Many of them are trying to find a way to be good citizens in Europe. But there are others who don’t want to be part of Europe. Therefore, one must speak of the Tablighis and the Salafis and about the Hizb-ul-Tahir. One should not consider them as not being important. They are, and they will be important because there are problems within the Muslim communities in Europe and in the United States. Moreover, these divisions could be manipulated in order to advance certain political goals. We know that this will be the case in some groups and that there are states supporting certain groups. These divisions are not just inward; rather, there is more to these differences. The realization of this fact must be part of our understanding of the Muslim future.

Muslim Concerns

The first and most important concern, which is common to all groups, is how to remain Muslim. This is the first concern Muslims have when living in Europe or even in the United States. But what does it mean to “remain Muslim?” First, I
believe it means to protect one’s faith. Therefore, in speaking about Islam, one has to deal with faith and not culture or some other interpretation. The second goal is to keep one’s spirituality alive. I differentiate between faith and spirituality because this is a question between some Sufi groups and the so-called orthodox Muslims. Third is to adapt the practice of the faith to the environment, while remaining faithful to Islamic principles—that is, to mark out the path of balanced practice. The fourth goal is to preserve Islamic values, morality, and ethics. This is a main preoccupation of Muslims: How to preserve Islamic morality, principles, and ethics when living in a non-Muslim country.

All other aspirations and concerns arise from these main preoccupations. All groups agree on these points. Differences arise when the question is put as to how to achieve these goals. Therefore, although often addressing the same issues and even using the same words, Muslims come up with different responses to issues, such as how to remain Muslim or the definition of Muslim identity. In fact, in Europe, within Muslim communities there is no single definition of the Islamic culture or Muslim identity to which all Muslims can subscribe. This is a reality, and Muslims should be free to acknowledge it. It is part of the diversity of the community. Moreover, this is the reality for a whole range of issues, notably education.

Depending on one’s definition of Muslim identity, the type of preferred Islamic education is different. For example, if a group believes that, to remain Muslim is to remain Pakistani Muslim in Europe, then the education provided for the community would be different from that for those groups that have a different concept of Muslim identity. Similarly, European converts have their views on Islamic education, which should be taken into account.

In short, there are great differences in the way that Europe’s Muslims define identity, education, and other important concerns.

Education

The second most important concern of Europe’s Muslims, after that of how to remain Muslim, is the issue of Islamic education—its content, methodology, and goals. But in this respect, too, differences and disagreements are clear and deep. In this regard, three major attitudes on the part of Muslims can be identified.

The traditionalist approach. This attitude toward Islamic education is observable in the case of Tablīqi Jamiat, or the Salafis. These groups believe that the model of education to be followed should be that of the country of origin. Such attitudes are observable throughout Europe. This type of education is along the lines of methodology used in traditional Islamic schools—madrasahs—and which emphasize the method of learning the Qur’an and the Hadith by heart. This type of education is also aimed at protecting young Muslims from the broader society. This is true especially in the case of females, and that is one reason why there are so many Islamic schools for young girls. This is not done to promote education; it is done to
What Are European Muslims’ Concerns and Aspirations?

Parallel schools. The second type of education is provided through a parallel system. This system is prevalent. This type of school is also largely disconnected from the broader environment. It aims at creating an alternative environment. One aspect of this parallel system is home schooling, which again is aimed at avoiding the mainstream school system and being totally disconnected from the overall environment.

Complementary system. A third category popular in France and even Germany is the so-called complementary education, which is based on an extracurricular approach and is directly connected with the broader environment. Because of this approach, there are no Islamic schools in France at present. Perhaps one will be set up in the future. What exists in France is what can be characterized as complementary activities. Nevertheless, despite all these differences, education—or in other words how to transmit Islamic faith, values, and good behavior within a European context—is a prime concern.

Legal Integration

The third concern is legal integration. That is, how to give religious legitimacy to a Muslim presence. An important part of the Muslim experience in Europe and the United States now is to find a way to legitimate Islam’s presence through a rereading of Muslim scriptural sources. Muslims in Europe are feeling that they are part of the European landscape; they want to be integrated not only at a social level, but also legally, while remaining faithful to Islamic principles derived from Islamic sources—the Qur’an and the Sunna. However, in this regard, too, namely how to read and interpret Islamic sources, differences exist. Some groups, while small but very vocal and active, demand new legislation to accommodate Islamic law, specifically those related to personal status. For the first time last year, I heard this demand in France. A small group is saying, “We want them [the French] to change the law because now we are here; we are citizens of this country, and we want them to change the law and to accept our differences and our specificities.” Similar voices are heard in Germany and even in the United States. Some of these ideas are inspired by groups such as the Hizb-ul-Tahir. These voices, although small, have a great influence in some areas, notably deprived suburbs. They emphasize the “otherness,” say that they don’t want to be part of the national system, and maintain that Islam is against the French or British or any other European constitution.

The second category consists of those who want to withdraw into their own communities and to apply a literalist interpretation of the Sunna. This category insists that their constitution is the Sunna. The Salafis are part of this category. The Salafi literalist groups say that they have nothing to do with European constitutions and do not have to be involved in these societies; that the Sunna is their frame of reference. This attitude is promoted by the Saudi Arabian government. In most
European countries and the United States, many young Muslims are invited to Saudi Arabia free of charge, and when they come back after three or four years, they begin preaching that the Muslims do not have to follow the system of the country where they are living. They say the Muslims’ constitution is the Sunna.

The fourth attitude is that which can be described as reformist. Those who favor this approach believe that Islamic principles and law—Figh—should be reinterpreted to adapt to the European situation. This group is trying to find a way to remain faithful to Islam and to find a way to respect the constitution. They maintain that Muslims have a social, moral, and even political contract with the constitution of the country in which they live. Reformists are attacked by groups such as the Hizb-ul-Tahir as not being true Muslims because they advocate a constitution that is implemented by the kuffar (negators). Unfortunately, such views have a great deal of influence on uneducated or poorly educated Muslims in Europe.

Social, Political, and Academic Integration

For some Muslims, it is very important to become fully integrated in European societies and to develop a sense of rootedness. This is the view that the mainstream Muslim organizations are promoting. It is an effort to be part of the social fabric in Europe and to promote citizenship—to create a place for Muslim or Islamic organizations and, in short, to normalize the Muslim presence without trivializing it. The Muslim presence must be seen as normal but not as trivial to make clear that Muslims have something to give and to contribute to Europe. Part of this effort is trying to build a Western Islamic discourse in Europe.

There are contrary trends, however, that are working toward isolating the Muslim community from the rest of society, to generate a sense of otherness, to discourage political engagement, and to develop an alternative community. In their internal debates, Muslims and others must recognize this fact. One cannot just say, “Everything is good,” while facing great difficulties within the Muslim communities. These issues are important because they impact on the fundamental issue of “Are you or are you not faithful to your Islamic heritage?”

It is important to keep these debates in mind, even in the way books and speeches are presented, in order to make people understand that one is “faithful.” In a book I wrote about how to be a European Muslim, I started by talking about the fundamentals of Figh, in order to make people understand that “I am still within, I am still a Muslim, I am not going out.”

The Cultural Divide

An important issue in the intra-Muslim debate in Europe is whether one remains faithful to the Islam of the country of origin, to some concept of “pure Islamic culture,” or a European Islamic culture. The Salafis or the Tablighis say: “Our culture is
our culture of origin,” that is, Pakistani or Indian, or there is no culture out of the Sunna. There can be no new rulings on music or movies; all these are haraam. The other attitude is to promote a European Islamic culture, through a process of selection and the development of an alternative culture. In my opinion, this is and will be one of the most important issues for the European Muslims.

**Debate on Political Involvement**

There are some groups in Europe that are promoting the view that Muslims should not become involved in politics. The Tablighis and the Sallafis are among these groups. They are supported by certain countries that are telling them, “Don’t speak. Don’t be vocal about various events. Your concern is how to remain Muslim in this community. Don’t become involved in your society—or, if you want to be involved with your society, don’t speak about what is going on outside.” This attitude in effect disenfranchises the Muslims.

Another important group consists of those Muslim leaders of certain Islamic organizations that accept the fact that they are under the supervision of their country of origin and do not want to promote the kind of independence that could cut them off from their home countries.

Increasing numbers of Muslims and Muslim organizations, however, want to promote independence, including political independence, especially from other Muslim communities. One aspect of this trend is that they will accept financial assistance from a Muslim government, but without any kind of conditions attached. Moreover, many Muslims and Islamic organizations are trying to find a way to get financial support from the community itself, for conferences, lectures, and other events. They are doing this because they want to promote true citizenship and become, in Europe, a voice for the voiceless Muslims throughout the world.

This is what I personally want. I am a product of political immigration. And there is no point for me to live in a democratic state and remain quiet, silent, and not participate in the intellectual and critical process. I and other Muslims like me want to say to European governments, “Why are you promoting democracy within, while supporting dictatorships abroad?” Is it right? Is it wrong? As a citizen of Europe, I feel I have to promote democracy and pluralism everywhere and to be the voice of the voiceless Muslims throughout the world. This is, I believe, the trend of the future. But we have first to educate Muslims and promote dialogue within the community and make them understand that they should be real European Muslims.
The Muslim community in the United States is noted for its religious, cultural, national, linguistic, ethnic, sectarian, and ideological diversity. Representing all corners of the globe, it has reconstituted itself in different urban areas of the country. Its diversity is far greater than in any of the 56 Muslim nations that constitute the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), or in any nation that has incorporated Muslim immigrants into its body politic, whether in Australia, Canada, or Latin America.

There are no accurate figures that account for the number of Muslims in the United States. Neither the census data, nor the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, provides any information on religious affiliation of citizens or immigrants. Consequently, there exists a great disparity in the estimates of the number of Muslims in the United States, ranging from 2 million, as published by the B’nai B’rith, to 11 million, as reported by Warith D. Muhammad, leader of the Muslim American Society (MAS), the largest African-American Muslim community. At the same time, the Council on American Muslim Relations (CAIR) reports in its communiqués that there are 7 million Muslims in the United States. Although the numbers are contested, it is generally agreed that they are increasingly significant. The larger the community, Muslims believe, the bigger its potential impact in the political arena and its influence on policy. The figures appear to be also of importance to other communities.

Waves of Migration: When Did Muslims Arrive in America?

Some Muslims believe that they were instrumental in the discovery of America, since it is reported that Columbus used a navigational map prepared by the Arab geographer al-Idrisi. It is also believed by some that Muslims were the first immigrants to come to America from Spain after the Reconquista. Hence Islamic roots in America are old and offer a counterclaim to first permanent settlement—preceding the English in Jamestown and Plymouth.
The diversity of the Muslim population is in a sense related to America’s engagement with other parts of the world. The earliest Muslims to emigrate to the United States came in the 1870s, predominantly from what is now Lebanon and Syria. When the United States established immigration quotas, it assigned the lion’s share of visas to Europeans, hence the number of Muslim immigrants declined. In the 1950s, the United States recruited students from the Middle East to study at U.S. universities. They were being trained to create a core of pro-American, anti-Communist leadership upon their return to their homelands. Many had been socialized on national secular aspirations, the product of anticolonial liberation movements in their home countries. Predominantly Arab nationalists, they formed the Arab Student Association, which was Nasserite in its goals. Those who opted to settle in the United States eventually became the founders of pro-Arab, nationalist Arab-American organizations.

With the repeal of the Asia Exclusion Act in 1965, there was an influx of new immigrants from South Asia and the Arab world. A large number of the new South Asian immigrants arrived with an identity forged through the struggle of creating an Islamic state in Pakistan or were Arabs who had given up on Arab nationalism as a consequence of the defeat of 1967. They believed that nationalism is divisive and that only a return to Islam can restore Islamic power to Muslim nations. In 1963, with support from some Muslim states, they formed the Muslim Student Association (MSA). MSA was ideologically opposed to the Arab Student Association and their goal was to create a core of committed Islamic leadership that would, upon return to their homelands, establish Islamic states that would be a bulwark against socialism, nationalism, or champions of nonalignment. They were part of the brain drain of the region. Many of these students did not go back to their countries, but settled and established themselves in the Untied States. They advocated an Islam that was not restricted to private worship, but one that called for the formation of a distinct culture and civilization.

A study conducted in the 1970s on five mosques in the Northeast and the Midwest found that 75 percent of those interviewed were holders of advanced degrees (M.A. or Ph.D.). Thus, the Muslim community in the United States was then the best educated in the world with a ratio of advanced degree holders to nonholders higher than that of the general American population. However, that ratio has declined with the influx of refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, and Somalia. Indeed, some Iraqis, Lebanese, and Afghans are illiterate in both English and their own indigenous languages.

About one-third of the Muslim population in the United States is African-American, whose ancestors were forcibly relocated to the Americas. It is estimated that 18 percent of slaves from Africa were Muslim, the majority of whom were converted to Christianity. The conversion of African-Americans to Islam is a twentieth century phenomenon, which appears to be directly related to their rejection of racism in America. The quest for an alternative identity than the one ascribed to them by the slave masters, and the need to ground it in an authentic root, led Noble Drew Ali to establish the Moorish-American Movement. After his death, many of his fol-
Linguistic and Ethnic Diversity

Muslim diversity is also evident in the variety of languages and dialects the immigrants have brought with them to America’s shores, as well as the range of their ethnic and tribal identities. Language and cultural differences continue to act as an impediment to the integration of Muslims into a cohesive group. Immigrants from Arab countries may not be able to communicate with one another since their dialects are so different. These linguistic divisions are not only among immigrants from different nation states, but are also evident among the members of one nation. For example, in Virginia there are three Mosques where each community speaks a different Afghani language.

Religious Affiliations

The diversity of the Muslim communities in the United States is also evident in the variety in religious affiliations they continue to espouse, as each immigrant group appears to have transplanted its particular understanding and distinctive interpretation of Islam. In some cases, their particular ideas have flourished in diaspora away from the watchful eyes of vigilant governments and adversaries. Some of the religious leaders and imams who continue to propagate these teachings have been especially imported from overseas to supervise the institutions that have been established in the United States and to sustain the community and its young in the teachings of the faith.

The earliest umbrella organization, the Federation of Islamic Associations (FIA), was organized in 1954. It included 52 mosques and Islamic centers in the United States and Canada, representing the immigrant Muslim community, which at the time was predominantly Sunni from Lebanon, Syria, and East Europe with one Shi’ite mosque in Dearborn. The FIA ceased to exist in the early 1990s as it was overshadowed by the dominant organizations established by the new immigrants that came after 1965. These new Sunni organizations include the Islamic Society of North America and the Islamic Circle of North America.

All forms of Shi’ite Islam have also been transplanted to the United States. There are Jaafaris (Twelver Shi’ites), who emigrated from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, with a large concentration in Dearborn, Michigan. Several other Shi’ite groups represented in the United States include the Ismailis or Seveners (who emigrated from South Asia, some via East Africa and the United Kingdom). And finally there are the Zaydis or the Fivers from Yemen who are concentrated in upstate New York,
Michigan, and California. Other non-Sunni groups include the Druze (who emigrated from Lebanon, Syria, and Israel) and the Alawis, who recognize 11 imams (and emigrated from Syria and Lebanon).

Other groups include over 50 Sufi organizations spread throughout the United States that have attracted converts to Islam. One of the most interesting is the Bawwa Muhayyadin Fellowship in Philadelphia, which has about 4,000 white seekers. Most were children of the 1960s who were seeking a new identity that is not part of the prevalent drug scene.

Generations

There is a marked difference between those who emigrated in the 1960s and the children and grandchildren of the immigrants of the 1870s. The latter have moved into the middle class and identify as Americans. They and their relatives have been drafted into the U.S. military and have served their country with distinction. The new immigrants who came as adults in the 1960s with preformed identities and a distinctive worldview are in the process of negotiating their identity in a hostile American environment. Increasingly their children are reshaping them into Americans.

For the children, the United States is the only homeland they know. They often repeat, “I want my parents’ religion but not their culture.” The parents on the other hand have been teaching their Pakistani, Arab, or Afghan culture as the true Islam in an effort to keep their children within the tradition. It is too early to guess where this process will lead, especially in the light of American hostility to nonprivatized Islam. Increasingly Americans are asking them to define themselves vis-à-vis the United States. What does it mean to them to be an American? Do they want to be American or “hyphenated American”? Do they think of themselves as being a Muslim living in America? Do they think of themselves as being an American Muslim? Or do they think of themselves as Americans who happen to be Muslim? While the answers to such questions may vary, there no doubt that the U.S. public, the U.S. security apparatus, as well as the U.S. government, are increasingly demanding a clear and unequivocal answer.
When discussing the case of African-American Muslims, the most significant point to emphasize is that they are the most successfully assimilated Muslims: they are modern and living in the West, and their identities are not challenged. The identity of the African-American Muslim is his or her American identity, whereas his or her Islam may be suspect. This aspect is very important because of the historical experience of African-Americans in the context of white American society and the whole history of this country. Therefore, when you talk about Islam among African-Americans, it is not an Islam that is not modern; the modernity of the African-American in American society is not contested. I don’t think that there is any U.S. sociologist who would contest the modernity of the African-American Muslims. The question is, “Why do they use Islam?” That phenomenon is very important and must be well understood because it will affect the direction, the nature, and the content of Islam in American society. Many Muslims who are from overseas may have problems with accepting this sociological formulation. Nevertheless, it has implications in terms of the future direction of Islam in this country.

Therefore, it is important that this phenomenon be examined in its proper historical, sociological, and psychological context, in order to permit us to draw a picture of what Islam means in the African-American experience.

Historical Context

From an historical perspective, three points need to be emphasized when dealing with the issue of Islam in the African-American experience. First, Islam was part of the African slave trade. As a result of some good work, notably that by Sylviane Diouf in Servants of Allah,4 which draw on various sources—French, English, Spanish, and Portuguese, as well as the works of Islamologists—to bring together all the

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relevant literature, with regard to what happened during the slave trade, we now have a reasonably good view of the experience of Islam and slavery. Other works, including Austin’s *African Muslims in Antebellum America* and those of others who collected relevant material regarding this experience, further clarify the picture of Islam in the African-American Muslim experience, establishing a historical antecedent. There is a revisionist school among Muslims in America, which is trying to find historical roots for Islam in pre-Columbian America. This is not surprising and is part of the enlightened debate about origins. Americans have canonized a particular version of the history of this country; but I think historical evidence is going to revise that canonization. Indeed, there have been books written by Irish- and Jewish-Americans claiming that they came here before Columbus. Therefore, it is natural that the Muslims, who are “the new kids on the block” are creating their own mythology. In the case of the African-American, the historical data show a connection between the antebellum and contemporary periods of African-American history.

In the context of analyzing Islam in the United States today, in the case of African-Americans, this historical connection becomes very interesting. There is debate about how far back this connection goes, but when talking about the future and the present time, the linkage is evident. This is why African-American Muslims do not like what they call the “wave of immigration” theory of Muslim immigration to America. A prominent critic of this theory is the chair of political science at the University of Indiana (Terre Haute) and a leading scholar of African-American Islam.

**Sociological Context**

From a sociological point of view, the most significant factor is that African-Americans were totally Christianized. That is why, in American society today, there is a branch of American Christianity that is called “Black Christianity,” because of the historical role of the black church in American society. So African-Americans in rural America were Christians. When the African-Americans began to move in large numbers from the rural South to northern cities, they met different waves of European immigrants and Arab immigrants, and also encountered Muslim immigrants. Some of these immigrants had come from Southeastern Europe, Bosnians and Albanians among them. There were also people from the Middle East. Thus one can speculate that the earliest encounters were between African-Americans—who were Christian Southerners coming to urban America—and these Muslims from Southern Europe or the Middle East. Later, they would encounter Muslims from South Asia, especially Punjab. In other words, you have two forms of Islamic encounter among African-Americans.

The difference in the nature of the encounter has given rise to two types of African-American Muslims, what Gordon Melton calls “Islamic” and “Islamized.”

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Islam in Europe and the United States

Islamized are those African-Americans who are usually identified by some sociologists as peddlers of proto-Islam. That is to say, the Moorish Science Temple and a number of other African-American groups, which embrace the Black nationalist philosophy and some beliefs and rituals of Islam. These are those whom Melton would call Islamic, namely, those who embrace orthodox Islam. Indeed, both from historical and sociological points of view, one can make a distinction between those African-Americans who can be identified as orthodox Muslims, in the sense that their behavior and the rituals that they follow parallel almost exactly those of orthodox Muslims in other parts of the Muslim world, and those who are Islamized. The latter category includes the Nation of Islam led by Farad Muhammad and Elijah Muhammad. They have certain Islamic elements in the body of their beliefs and rituals, but they are clearly not Muslims. This category of Muslims actually was part of movements that some scholars characterize as system-challenging movements. And this is where one can see a parallel between those black Americans who embrace Islam for a specific ideological purpose and some of the radical immigrant groups.

In fact, there are very interesting intellectual, emotional, and psychological similarities between those Muslims who follow radical groups, such as Hizbul-Tahrir, and the system-challenging African-Americans who feels that America has wronged them and that America is the “other.” There are such people in the African-American community. They are a minority, but they do exist, and many of them often hide behind an exaggerated, distorted interpretation of dominant ideologies. For example, during the Cold War era, some of them became Marxists, and others created proto-nationalist movements like the Black Panther Party and the Republic of New Africa. These groups constitute the secularist system-challenging African-Americans. The non-secularists among the African-Americans would embrace a metaphysical or a religious worldview; thus they become Islamized, or they become Judaized, or they become Christianized. And if you look at the intellectual landscape within the African-American community, you will find African-Americans who call themselves Hebrews: Yahweh Ben Yahweh and Ami Ben Carter. They are the equivalent of the Nation of Islam. One does not hear much about them, but they exist and affect the relationship between the Jews, the Israelis, and African-Americans.

The Nation of Islam performs the same psychological role among the Muslims. For instance, Louis Farrakhan visits Muslim countries. In fact, sometimes Farrakhan is more popular among Muslims abroad than among Muslims in the United States because of this political dimension and his ideological posturing. Other system-challenging African-American Muslims include the Islamic Party of North America, which was founded in Washington, D.C, and had a publication called Al-Islam, and the Islamic Brotherhood, Inc. An important point to be emphasized is that those African-Americans who embrace orthodox Islam had been around long before the emergence of the Nation of Islam, but this part of history is not widely known. You have people like Daud Faisal, who was in Brooklyn for many years. He claimed to be the son of a Moroccan father and a West Indian mother. His wife, Sister Khadija, whom I had the chance to interview 21 years ago, claimed to be half...
Pakistani and half West Indian black. They claim that they practice Sunni Islam. And, of course, there is the connection between some African-American musicians and Sunni Islam, although some of them identify with the Bahai faith. This is not very unusual because they were in New York, which is very cosmopolitan.

In examining Islam within the African-American community, it is important to emphasize that this is an evolving phenomenon and that many African-American Muslims and Muslim organizations undergo processes of transformation. For instance, the transformation of the Nation of Islam is significant because Daud Faisal and all the other Sunni Muslims within the African-American communities formed a miniscule group. Faisal was in Brooklyn for many years, and he influenced many of the African-Americans who embraced Sunni Islam. But he was different from his followers, or those who claim to have been influenced by him. Indeed, some of them now dismiss him as heretical. Then, there is the case of Imam Isha el Mahadi, who claimed to be a descendant of the Mahadi of Sudan. He and his followers used to dress in jallabias and had long beards, and all their publications were in Arabic. All of that has now changed. Now he calls himself Dr. York. Now he wears cowboy boots and cowboy hats, and he has his own musical group. I mention these cases to show the Americaness and the modernity of some of the African-Americans who embrace Islam. This transformation is part of the modernity of African-American Muslims. It also proves the fact that you can reinvent yourself in America. So those Muslims who are able to go through this protean self-transformation will evince some kind of modernity.

The other type of transformation is that of those trying in their own way to balance the demands of modernity on the one hand and the legal and ethical discipline of Islam on the other. An important example is Imam Warith D. Muhammad—the son of Elijha Muhammad—who has transformed the Nation of Islam and is now leading the largest community of African-American Muslims. However, this is not an easy task.

Another very important aspect of the African-American situation is that, even within an Islamized group like Farrakhan’s, there is a conscious or unconscious attempt to project oneself on the American stage in all areas and to prove one’s modernity. For example, many within the American elite groups—and you can see this at Yale and Harvard Universities—like to wear bow ties in order to underscore some kind of social significance. Louis Farrakhan also wears bow ties.

Moreover, the new generation within the antiestablishment category of African-American Muslims is trying to reverse this attitude and to emphasize their Americaness and patriotism. Thus Warith D. Muhammad has transformed the Nation of Islam into the opposite of what his father had created. For example, his father created Muhammad Speaks, a publication that represented the ultimate anti-American group in the United States, but the son has made a 180-degree turn, to change his father’s legacy. His father wrote a book called The Fall of America, which

is an eschatological work projecting that the United States is going to fall like Baby-
lon. But his son, Imam Warith D. Muhammad, has gone in the opposite direction
and has instituted Patriotism Day, in order to celebrate Americanism. And he has
encouraged reconciliation and dialogue with white America and with Christians, to
the point that now one can see that the Focolore movement within the Catholic
Church is very closely linked to the Warith D. Muhammad group. And Warith D.
Muhammad has been going to Rome to meet with the Pope, and he is now very
much in demand in certain interfaith circles. This attitude has affected his followers
and has encouraged them to engage in dialogue with African-American Christians
and with other groups, such as the Jewish community.

Conclusions

The main conclusions about the characteristics and dynamics of the African-Amer-
ican Muslim community follow.

■ There are trends and counter-trends within the community.

■ The African-American Muslim community, in many ways, mirrors all the prob-
blems that exist in Afro-America as well as in the larger American society. This is
so because the big challenge facing all religious groups is how to deal with
modernity and post-modernity. Therefore, when Samuel Huntington intro-
duced the idea of the “Clash of Civilizations” (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993),
he presented only half of the picture. That is why he was criticized by many
scholars. I think the reality is—and African-American Muslims underscore this
reality—that in American society, modern and post-modern, human beings are
forced to hedge their bets regarding the transcendent because of man’s increas-
ing feeling of superiority. In the past, human beings felt superior by virtue of
theological formulations in their scriptures. Now it is science that reassures
them. He asks, “Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is fairest of them all?” And the
mirror answers, “You.” This is what science is doing for human beings: making
them feel superior. This reality creates a big problem in the African-American
community. In fact, all of the problems related to modernity that are affecting
Americans are evident in the African-American community. And African-
American Muslims also have to negotiate the modernity phenomenon and its
ramifications. For them, these are not merely theoretical issues, but rather real-
alties of everyday life. Those who live in Pakistan, in Africa, and in parts of the
Muslim world can insulate themselves from the effects of modernity. But not in
the United States. Therefore, the African-American Muslim, whether in the
ghetto or in the suburb, has to negotiate modernity. This is the reality of life.

■ Members of the African-American Muslim community are different from the
immigrant Muslim community in the sense that they do not have immigration

7. Editor’s note: A Catholic organization that held dialogue with Imam Warith D. Muham-
mad.
experience. In other words, they are the only community among the Muslims here who have not traveled the path of immigration and all the experiences related to it. In short, the experience of African-American Muslims is unique. But it has important implications for other Muslims, in particular in terms of how they negotiate and deal with modernity and its manifestations in American society. In that sense, this experience is important for the future of Islam in America as a whole.
Before discussing the major concerns and the main aspirations of American Muslims, I would like to point out that most of this analysis is derived from the meetings and seminars that were organized as part of the Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS) Project. Through these seminars and other focus groups, we assembled nearly 300 community leaders, representatives of Islamic centers, imams, principals of Islamic schools, and other Muslim leaders. We held seminars in Atlanta, Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. We also had one seminar for youth leadership; and there were two focus groups, one for mid-level leaders of Islamic centers, and another for those who are working full time for Islamic causes.

In these meetings, we listened to these leaders and representatives of the Muslim community as they explained their concerns and aspirations. The overall impression that we got was that there was a sense of achievement, a sense of success among these Muslims. In fact, we were surprised at the low level of complaints about the media and the system in general. Rather, there was a general sense of achievement and success and belonging in the United States.

Principal Concerns

The number-one concern was the future of Muslim youth and their education and training, especially the transmission of Islamic ideals and education to the future generations. In light of this result, we organized a youth seminar, in which we discussed some of the same issues. More than 40 young leaders from different campuses, different cities, and representing different shades of Islamic thinking took part in this seminar. A major issue raised was that of the transfer of leadership to the younger generation. Many young leaders said, “Yes, our elders, our first generation leaders, did a wonderful job. But now is the time for them to abdicate
leadership.” Yet, the older generation is not abdicating that leadership. Thus, this is one controversy within the community, and it creates a contradictory situation: on the one hand, the old leadership is always saying that the youth are the number-one issue, youth education is the number-one priority; on the other hand, they are not yet ready to relinquish their leadership role.

What Kind of Islam and What Kind of Muslim Identity?

Another issue is what kind of identity Muslims in the United States will develop and what kind of Islam will become broadly accepted within the community. Given the pressures that American society’s dominant culture is putting on Muslims, the issue of what kind of Islam will become dominant is debated within the community. The issue of what terminology to use to describe the conditions of Muslims and Islam in United States is also debated. Is there an “American Islam,” are there “American Muslims,” or should we talk about “Islam in America?” The question is whether American Islam will become a reformed Islam, similar to a reformed Judaism or a reformed Catholicism, or will it be a more conservative Islam?

In the meantime, there is serious concern about the impact of the majority culture on certain aspects of Muslim life, especially the structure of the family. Only a few years ago, few Muslims would admit that there were any family-related problems in the community. They were, in fact, in total denial. But now, they admit there are problems related to women’s rights, the increase in the rate of divorce, issues related to custody of children, etc. On all of these issues, there are problems between the first and second generation of Muslims.

What is now generally accepted is that there are problems. For instance, nobody disputes that the increasing rate of divorce is a problem. In the West, the rate of divorce is about 50 percent, whereas in the Middle East it is only 10 percent. But among Muslims in New York and Chicago, the rate is 30 percent. A related concern is how to cope with these problems and to create educational and counseling services for families before marriage, during marriage, and during the course of divorce.

Refugee Resettlement

Another major concern is the resettlement of Muslim refugees, who constitute more than 80 percent of the world’s refugee population. But most of the national organizations dealing with these issues are composed of non-Muslims. Therefore, many are not sensitive to cultural and other concerns of Muslims, especially female refugees and children who do not speak English. There is a great need to create Muslim organizations that can deal with these problems at the local and national levels.
Indigenous versus Immigrant Muslims

Another major concern is the cleavage between the immigrant Muslims and the indigenous Muslim population. They represent two different models, in fact, two different worlds that are being developed. Their concerns are different; their building style is different. Suburban mosques are bigger and more beautiful, whereas inner-city mosques are very poor and poorly maintained, because of inadequate financial resources. The leadership’s style is totally different. In the inner-city mosque or the indigenous mosque, the imam is the leader for everything from Islamic education to family counseling. He is the leader of the entire community.

In U.S. immigrant communities, the imam is the employee of the board of trustees, and the board is composed of doctors and businessmen who give a lot of money to build the mosque. In other words, the system is similar to that of other Muslim countries. The board can dismiss the imam any time they want or impose restrictions and rules on him.

There are also differences on political issues between the indigenous Muslims and the immigrants. Thus when immigrant Muslim organizations endorsed George Bush for president, there was strong resentment among the indigenous leadership. Therefore, there is a need to address these differences and to reconcile them. Presently, there are several proposals about how to deal with these problems.

Muslim Aspirations

Muslims who are American citizens are looking not only for recognition, but also for participation in the various aspects of the system. They want not only that their concerns should be heard, that the media should realize their existence, but also that they should be able to take part in the political process and have some role in policymaking. This process will take place in any event, so it is better to encourage it and channel it in constructive ways.

For example in social welfare areas, Muslims are involved in several local projects. But unlike the Catholic and Jewish charities, which respectively receive $2.5 and $3 billion annually from the government, Muslims get no help. Meanwhile American Muslims are contributing to other Muslim societies both financially and intellectually. Immigrant communities help their home countries, and the indigenous community would like to help the African countries. Therefore, there are a lot of efforts to establish developmental-type strategies in the areas of health, education, children, or to create foundations to grant scholarships.

American Muslims are also helping other Muslims to realize the values of compromise, tolerance, and interfaith dialogue. Muslims are very much involved in dialogues with Catholics and to some extent with the Jewish community, but not with the Evangelical movement. People from Muslim countries are coming here to learn about such dialogues and the kind of leadership involved in them. In short,
Muslim leaders and Muslim communities are contributing to the Muslim world, not only materially but also in terms of values—such as democracy, human rights, rule of law, and civil society.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Muslim community is still facing many internal debates, including those posed by more radical groups, such as Hizb-ul-Tahir. Nevertheless, gradually but steadily, they are becoming involved in the issues of concern to society.

As we look to the future, the main question is whether the experience of Islam and the Muslim community in the United States will be exceptional, as the American experience itself was exceptional. By this I mean, will Islam, like other religions, be reformed with the second or third generation, becoming absorbed in the cultural melting pot of America? Or will Islam and subsequent Muslim generations be exceptions, in the sense that they will maintain their religion and their identity?

An example of this dilemma is the case of Hashim Rahman, a Muslim from Baltimore, who unexpectedly won the heavyweight boxing championship in South Africa. In the media, he is referred to as Hasim Rockman. His nickname is “the Rock.” Yet Rahman is one of the names of God, and it means “the merciful.” But this is not recognized in the media. He has two prospects: Either to win his success and behave like Mike Tyson or to become an American icon for the whole world. This is also the case for the Muslim community. If it is not recognized, it can go in the wrong direction and be derailed; if recognized, it can become an American icon for the whole world of Islam.
When I was given the topic, “Integrating Islam into American Society,” I prepared some thoughts and prescriptions about how to accomplish this task. But much of what I had to say has already been touched on. So let me just take a few minutes to offer some observations about how American Muslims are most likely to make their voices heard in this country.

In the last two years, I have come to know the American-Muslim community very well. In the year 2000, I had a one-year appointment at the State Department, dealing with human rights issues and helping to arrange various meetings between State Department officials and different American-Muslim leaders and opinion makers. I heard a great deal about the many foreign policy concerns of the American-Muslim community, came to understand the scope of American-Muslim aspirations, and learned the depth of their most important concerns. Most of all, I saw how eager American Muslims are to simply have the opportunity to express their thoughts and feelings.

During 2001, I was working on a project to make a documentary film on the life of the Prophet Muhammad. This, too, brought me into contact throughout the country with American Muslims of all different social and economic levels. In meeting after meeting, the lessons of the previous year have been reinforced. Above all else, the American-Muslim community is seeking a place of honor and respect in American society.

American Muslims are well integrated into the economy of this society. Far from the stereotype of Muslims either being cab drivers or shopkeepers, American Muslims work in almost every economic field and live at every level of society. Yet, many feel that they are not completely welcomed in American society, as many misunderstandings and biases still exist about Islam in the United States. Like Catholic and Jewish Americans before them, Muslim Americans often find themselves the object of jokes, suspicion, and various media caricatures. Also like earlier generations of Catholics and Jews, although the first immigrants were willing to “go along in order to get along,” their American-born children are more assertive. A growing
number of Muslims, particularly those belonging to the younger generation, are aspiring to become decisionmakers, policymakers, and opinion makers in this country. Not content just to benefit economically, they want a role in contributing to the project of America. And as such, they seek to “normalize” Islam in American society, making it seem less foreign and exotic, and more integrated into the American scene.

How Will American Muslims Make their Presence Felt?

How is this more assertive American Islam making its presence known? To answer this question, one must appreciate the great diversity of the American-Muslim population, not only culturally among the Pakistani, Arab, Iranian, Indian, Indonesian, African, and African-American communities, but also religiously. There are people who are very devout and rigorous in their practices, but who define these practices differently. Others are not very observant, but are very attached to the cultural aspects of the faith. Some have only a distant feeling of connection to Islam.

But all of them share one concern, and that is the civil rights of American Muslims. It is therefore in this area that the public presence of Muslims is greatest. When it comes to issues involving civil rights, be it dress or wearing a beard or the way Muslims are negatively characterized in books or in the media, Muslims come together. Muslims engage in letter writing campaigns and legal action when these rights are violated.

However, because Muslims do not face the kind of systematic prejudice that, say, African-Americans faced, the Muslim-American civil rights movement has not evolved into a cohesive political movement, as it did for African-Americans. Also, there is a basic political divide between the immigrant American Muslim communities, which tend to lean in the direction of the Republicans, and the indigenous African-American community, which tends to be Democratic. This was made clear during the last presidential election when many of the largely immigrant-led Muslim organizations officially endorsed the candidacy of George Bush, a move that was controversial and in some quarters rejected by the African-American Muslim community.

The diversity of the American-Muslim community also limits its influence in foreign policy debates. Quite simply, the money and attention of the American-Muslim community is divided among many foreign policy concerns, instead of just one.

So it is in the area civil rights that the American Muslims seem to be most successful making their presence felt in the United States. It is likely that it will be through empowerment by the U.S. Constitution and the press for civil rights, rather than through political action, that American Muslim aspirations to join in the project of America will most likely be met. So, rather than eventually being expressed as voting block, or a major force in various policy debates, we should
expect that the Muslim voice will be expressed by individuals whose growing opportunities and personal empowerment will help them attain decisionmaking and opinion-making positions in American society. American-Muslim groups are paving the way, but it will be individual American Muslims who will be the ones who will bring Islamic perspectives to the project of America.
European Responses to the Muslim Presence

Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld

Historical Background

The early history of Islam in Europe, as a minority religion, started in the Christian kingdoms of Spain where, from the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries, Muslims lived as tolerated minorities, against the explicit will of the church but under special protection of royalty, much in the same way as the Jews lived in Medieval Europe. This situation came to an end at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when all remaining Muslims that had been brought under Christian rule were baptized by force. One century later, their descendants were expelled. In the other Christian-ruled countries of Europe, there was no form of religious tolerance for Muslims. The numerous slaves of Muslim origin that played an important role in the economies of Southern European countries during the latter part of the Middle Ages and until the nineteenth century, when slavery was abolished, were baptized and provided with Christian names upon entering the European scene, as a matter of routine, and could only be liberated upon conversion and baptism.

Then there were areas in Eastern Europe, occupied for various periods from the sixteenth century onwards by the Ottoman Empire. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire took over some of these territories in the second half of the nineteenth century, Islamic law and customs of the Muslim populations left behind were respected. The same happened after World War I, when the Ottoman Empire was dismantled and Greece gained independence.

The earliest examples of freedom of Islamic worship in Western Europe date back to the period of the Enlightenment in the late-eighteenth century, when King Frederick the Great of Prussia allowed his Turkish soldiers to build a mosque on his own royal premises. However, it was only the French Revolution and the introduction of the separation of state and religion that gradually opened the way for equality and citizenship regardless of one’s religious conviction. However, it took a long time for these principles to be socially accepted: witness the notorious Dreyfus affair in late-nineteenth century France.
Though the neutrality of the state in religious matters is presently upheld as a constitutional principle in the whole of the European Union, it still faces serious anti-constitutional opposition from various extremist circles, especially in the case of Muslims. The historic hatred of Islam caused by Christian-Muslim military confrontations and by long-standing Christian theological doctrine, although now formally revoked, is exploited and encouraged by right-wing political parties in most of the European Union’s member states, generating what is being called in contemporary research “anti-Islamism” or “Islamophobia.” Thus the Northern League in Italy stigmatizes Islam as one of the three worst pests of history, in addition to Imperial Rome and communism.

A pamphlet distributed anonymously at night, in quarters with a high density of immigrant families in a Dutch city, may serve as a second example. It showed on one side a photograph of Hitler and on the other side a mass grave in Auschwitz with a subscription, “A good Muslim is a dead Muslim.”

Both anti-Islamism and Islamophobia have a theoretical construct and a political weapon. Anti-Islamism is, of course, a sheer racist ideology with a high degree of similarity to anti-Semitism, even though these political parties nowadays do not openly express themselves in traditional racist or Fascist terms. Rather, they are rearticulating and translating these views into the contemporary spectrum of publicly acceptable discourse, notably by “criminalizing” Islam or immigrants. Careful observers, however, will hardly be misled about the true nature of these movements, which form the historical continuation of prewar European fascism. The only innovation is that Muslims, blacks, and Asians have been added to the traditional list of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, etc.

Categories of Europe’s Muslims

Muslims now living in the member states of the European Union may be broadly divided into three categories:

- The old Muslim communities of Europe, to be found mainly in Greece and in Spanish North Africa. With their distinct juridical statutes, they form, in fact, the sole communitarian exception to the generally prevailing rule of a single set of civil laws applicable, in principle, to all citizens and residents in each member state of the European Union.

- The overwhelming majority of Muslim migrants and their descendents present in all member states of European Union. This category can be subdivided into the following: (a) Muslims who came to Europe in the colonial or postcolonial contexts. Many of these Muslims had cooperated closely with colonial powers as soldiers, officials, or traders; (b) Those who came as laborers; and (c) Those Muslims who came as refugees. This last wave of migration has brought numerous Muslim intellectuals to Europe who were persecuted for their religious beliefs or political convictions, including prominent spokesmen of opposition Islamist movements, as well as scholars, artists, and writers with outspoken lib-
eral views. As a result, Europe, especially England and France, have become important centers for the production and diffusion of various new, normative Islamic discourses, including in non-European languages, such as Arabic.

■ The European converts to Islam. Their numbers are small, but they are highly visible in the media. Within the group, there are two trends in their numerous writings: an activist and at times polemical and outspoken anti-Western trend, and a mystically oriented, quietist trend.

Legal Status of Muslims

In general, those groups of Muslims that migrated to Europe in the colonial and postcolonial contexts quickly obtained the citizenship of their new home countries. The situation of the workers and refugees, however, is different. The degree to which they, as well as their descendents, have acquired a new citizenship differs from country to country because of diverging laws and practices regarding naturalization. The United Kingdom is a special case because migrants coming from the countries that are members of the British Commonwealth enjoy rights of citizenship. Proposals to create legal possibilities for double citizenship meet with fierce opposition in several states; this opposition does not come only from extremist right-wing parties. In comparison with the United Kingdom and France, Germany is lagging behind in terms of granting citizenship. One of the obvious consequences of this situation is a much lower level of political participation by Muslim groups in Germany, as compared to the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands.

Moreover, in some countries (e.g., the Netherlands and Denmark), noncitizens are allowed to participate politically at municipal levels, both passively and actively. Citizenship, however, is an important prerequisite in several European states for the official recognition of religious organizations, and for obtaining financial support from the state. The member states of the European Union have, indeed, deeply committed themselves by their constitutions, as well as by a whole network of European and international treaties to the ideals of democracy and human rights, including religious freedom. In this sense, we may legitimately speak of a European identity. Witness also the existence of a European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where member states may be brought to justice for alleged infringements of human rights, including religious freedom, within their boundaries. However, the actual application of religious freedom to the citizens and residents of European countries largely depends on the system of public law in each sovereign state.

A characteristic feature of Europe, as part of what Americans call the “old world,” is its historical diversity of languages and national traditions. Part of this diversity of tradition is the different sets of legal and political rules governing relations between state and religion, an important cultural area where, so far, the member states of the European Union have retained almost complete sovereignty. In some states, even more than one set of rules is applied in this respect, as in the Federal Republic of Germany, where the principle of cultural autonomy, kulturho-
beit, allows for different legal arrangements governing religion-state relations in each of the länder. Even in France, where a strict separation between state and religion prevails, Alsace and Lorraine form an exception as they continue to follow the previous German system of state-religion relations following their annexation by France after World War I. This situation is due to the fact that, depending on the religious maps and political constellations of European states, the separation of state and religion within the wider context of the processes of secularization and modernization went through different stages of legislation and resulted in widely different legal systems. Even at the present time, this process is not completed, as illustrated by recent constitutional reforms in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden. The point to be stressed here is that separation in most, if not all, cases did not mean the end of different forms of cooperation between state and religion in certain areas—including the granting of financial assistance by the state, albeit within the framework of newly formulated conditions.

After a long marriage, state and church in Europe decided to continue their relationship as partners, so to speak, but they quarreled about the terms of their new partnership. The areas and the conditions of their future cooperation, as well as the financial assistance to be provided by the state to religious organizations, became the main elements of discord. On the basis of the constitutional principles of equality and neutrality in most European states, Muslims, too, can obtain the same partnership, but only if they fulfill the same conditions as other religions. In this context, one of the main obstacles faced by Muslims is the condition that the religious partner must be recognized and invested with authority by the group it claims to represent.

European states used to have well-organized churches as their partners. And Muslims in most of these states are, in fact, invited to organize themselves more or less after the ecclesiastical model. But Islam, especially the majority Sunni variant, leaves authority in religious matters in the hands of the Muslims at large and rejects, as a matter of principle, the authority of clergymen to rule in matters of confession.

During the course of its history, Islam did not develop an institution comparable to the church. Nowadays, Muslims in Europe are organized at national or international levels in widely varying organizations along ethnic, confessional, or ideological lines. Moreover, differing interests of the governments of their countries of origin, like Turkey, prevent the efficient coordination of the Muslims’ efforts and cooperation among them. Because of these factors, Muslims are unable to create organizations that can represent them in relation to the states. The result is a persistent form of inequality between the established religions, which receive assistance (sometimes very important forms of assistance and cooperation in many important areas from the state), and Muslims who have no access to these means.
State-Religion Relations

Broadly speaking, three types of arrangement of state-religion relations can be identified in Europe. The first type is that of an official state church, whereby religious freedom is guaranteed to all other religious groups, including Muslims. This is the case in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Norway. In these cases, strictly speaking, there is legal equality among all religious groups in society. Nevertheless, although all religious groups outside the British state church are equal, some of them are more equal than others. This is especially true in the case of Muslims, who have been unable so far to build up a network of confessional schools paid by the state, contrary to the other old-established religious groups outside the Church of England.

In Sweden, ties between the state church and the state have been loosened in a new constitution passed in 2000, although the Church of Sweden has retained a privileged place. In order to get financial support from the state, religious communities other than the Church of Sweden, have to be officially recognized by registration for this purpose. Muslims have had to conform to an organizational structure that is somewhat similar to that of the Swedish free churches, but so far without success.

The second type of arrangement of state-religion relations is that of various forms of official recognition, followed by an agreement of cooperation and financial assistance at various levels between a religious group and the state. This is the situation prevailing in most European states, notably Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, and Belgium.

In Italy, every religious group of Italian citizens—Muslims must be citizens, too—can sign an accord, an intessa, with the state, provided that they fulfill certain conditions such as real representativeness. In 1998, major Islamic organizations in Italy presented a joint draft for an intessa. Its acceptance does not seem likely in the short term, however, because the Muslim organizations are not organized along the lines of a centralized Christian church with a hierarchical ministerial bureaucracy, endowed with authority over the faithful.

The same situation prevails in Germany, where Muslim religious groups have so far not been successful in being organized as so-called köperschaften öffentlichen rechtes (corporate bodies of public law), a condition stipulated by German public law for cooperation between religious groups and the state and the provision of financial assistance to religious organizations by the state.

Austria, too, has a system of official recognition of religious organizations as corporate bodies of public law. Unlike Germany, however, the Islamic religious community gained official recognition in 1979. This recognition is contested and undermined in its effectiveness, however, by the influential Muslim organization in Austria, which is directly subordinated to the Turkish government.
Similar situations prevail in the case of Spain and Belgium, and although by the initiative of the state in both cases, representative Muslim bodies have been formed, so far no concrete patterns of cooperation have emerged.

The third type of state-religion relationships is that of total separation without any legal possibilities for forming official agreement that could lead to forms of direct cooperation between the state and religious groups and the provision of financial assistance. The best representatives of this category are France and the Netherlands. This system does not exclude every form of contract and cooperation between the state and religious organizations in areas recognized by the state to fall under the latter’s responsibility, such as providing spiritual assistance to people whose liberty has been restricted by the state, like prisoners and soldiers. However, neither in France nor in the Netherlands has a representative body been created by and for Muslims, although such bodies exist for Christian churches and for the Jews.

Politicians in various European countries have repeatedly emphasized the need for adjusting Islam to the legal and social parameters of their respective societies. They are pleading for what they call a Dutch, British, French, Swedish, or Spanish Islam. This means that Muslims in their respective countries should organize themselves according to prevailing church models. Remarkably, however, Muslim intellectuals living in Europe tend to reflect upon the position of Islam in this part of the world in European rather than in national terms. A prominent confessional spokesman of Islam in Europe, Tariq Ramadan, who is teaching philosophy in Switzerland, recently authored a book entitled *To Be a European Muslim*. This important work answers the question: How can Islam be harmonized with Europe’s basic constitutional principles of religious freedom, separation of state and religion, and official nonrecognition of important sections of Islamic religious law. Ramadan’s study is a theoretical exercise and does not express any preference for one of the manifold European systems of state-religion relations. On this point, his approach differs from that of Bassam Tibi, who teaches political science in Göttingen, Germany, and has for some time been defending what he calls Euro-Islam as the normative discourse to enable Muslims to integrate into European societies harmoniously—because Euro-Islam follows the Western definition of religion, leaving the legal side of social life to political authorities.

In his pleas for Euro-Islam, Tibi rejects the German system of cooperation between state and recognized religious groups because, he argues, Islam is unfit to be organized as a Christian church. According to Tibbi, with respect to Islam, Germany and Europe at large should follow the French system, where the separation between state and religion was developed to its utmost level and where religion was almost completely left to the private sphere.

The same trend to develop a new Islamic normative discourse in European terms is represented by the recent creation of the European Council for Iftâ and

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Research established in Dublin, Ireland. This council, which consists of leading religious scholars of Europe and the Near East, purports to formulate normative answers to problems arising for Muslims living in non-Muslim European societies. In 1999, the council published its first collection of fatwas in Cairo. In doing so, it is, in fact, continuing an existing important stream of fatwas on Islam in Europe coming from the Muslim world, especially from the Arab world, which among other issues deals with vital political questions, such as loyalty owed by Muslim residents and citizens to their non-Muslim European governments and political participation by Muslims in non-Muslim states.

It goes without saying that all these discussions are also of direct relevance to the situation in the United States. This also holds true for the very active role played by converts in westernizing Islamic discourse. For instance, a large majority of Web pages on the Internet dealing with Islam can be linked to young Muslim converts or young Muslims living in Europe or the United States. The importance of developing a European form of Islam is further transpiring in the recent work of two leading European scholars in the field, namely Jørgen Nielsen from Birmingham, England, who wrote *Towards a European Islam*,9 and Olivier Roy in France.

The supranational European or Western, rather than national, orientation of this new Islamic discourse can be explained in different ways. Looking at the Muslim groups concerned, it is relevant that many of them are distributed over several European countries and have organized themselves at a supranational European level. The best example is that of Turks who are living in Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, and France, and who have organized themselves in different organizations at the European level. For this reason, they might be seen as more European than many traditional Europeans. Looking at the religious scholars from the Muslim world who are contributing to this new discourse, the name Al-Qaradawi has already been mentioned. What is important is that their knowledge of the complex differences among numerous European member states may be limited. It is natural that they should want to stress the supranational unity of the Islamic community as umma on theological grounds. Also, the secularity of Europe and, indeed, of the Western world as a whole is the most significant background against which they are rethinking the position of Islam. In this light, differences between individual countries may appear trivial to them.

To conclude, in an era of growing European unity, diverse historical systems of state-religion relations of European states have faced great difficulties in absorbing non-Christian religious groups, especially Muslims, in terms of applying the principle of religious freedom and equality. Meanwhile, the European orientation of a newly emerging Islamic discourse cannot be discarded offhand, even though national laws on state-religion relations are still fully valid. Politically speaking, however, a Europe-wide reform of systems of state-religion relations seems very unlikely.

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The EU and Islam
Challenges and Opportunities

Fraser Cameron

Introduction

I would like to review briefly the relations between the EU and the Islamic world, and then look at the situation of Muslim communities within the EU and consider how they operate, or not, at the European level.

There is clearly considerable mutual distrust and misunderstanding between the EU and the Islamic world—but perhaps less so than the distrust that exists between the United States and the Islamic world. People often forget that a few centuries ago the relationship between Europe and the Islamic world was one of equals, after a long period of Islamic domination. In the nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, the relationship was one of colonialism, and we are still dealing with that legacy today. Some examples include the French in Algeria, the Spanish in Morocco, the British in Egypt and Palestine, and the Dutch in Indonesia.

In the past three decades there has been a substantial influx of Muslims into the EU. Estimates of current Muslim inhabitants in the EU range from 9 to 15 million, or around 5 to 6 percent of the total population. The latter figure would seem more accurate. Islam is the fastest-growing religion in Europe, and some suggest it is now the second religion. Gradually Muslims are making their influence felt at local, national, and European levels.

Promoting Peace and Stability

The EU’s first priority towards the Islamic world is the promotion of peace and stability. As the largest provider of technical and development assistance in the world, the EU’s purse strings are felt by most countries on the planet. The EU is the largest provider of funds to most Muslim countries, ranging from Indonesia to Turkey. It provided most of the funds to reconstruct the province of Kosovo. Most assistance flows to countries neighboring the EU.
In 1995 the EU established the Barcelona process with most (Muslim) countries in North Africa and the Middle East, plus Turkey. With an annual budget of 1 billion euros (the same amount as for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe negotiating to join the EU), the EU funds programs in the political, social, economic, trade, and cultural spheres. The priority is programs to promote economic modernization and thus create employment. The EU is also the largest trading partner of all countries in the Barcelona process. More could and should have been done in the Barcelona process, but partly due to problems surrounding the Middle East conflict and partly due to the lack of good projects, it has not been possible to disburse all the available funding.

The EU is also very active in the Middle East process. Not only is it the largest provider of funds for the Palestinian authority, but Javier Solana (the EU’s high representative for foreign and security policy) has recently been at the forefront in seeking to bring the parties back to the negotiating table.

Overall I think it fair to say that Europeans are more sympathetic to the Palestinians than are Americans. The reporting on the Middle East in Europe is certainly more objective than is the case in the United States. These pro-Arab sentiments also find expression in EU policy towards the Middle East, which is more evenly balanced than U.S. policy.

**Turkey**

As a Muslim country hoping to join the EU, Turkey is a special case. It has a long history of close relations with the EU, but at the same time there has been considerable mutual distrust based on misunderstandings. Partly prompted by the United States pushing Turkey’s candidacy, Ankara has been unwilling to make the necessary political, economic, and social changes to make itself ready for accession negotiations. It felt slighted when the EU moved ahead with the countries of Eastern Europe and refused to accept Turkey as a candidate. And Turkish suspicions of EU intentions were fuelled by statements from a Christian Democrat caucus meeting in Brussels four years ago when misgivings were raised about the impact of millions of (Turkish) Muslims becoming EU citizens. (These remarks were immediately disavowed by EU leaders, but some damage was done.) That is now history, and Turkey is on track to fulfilling the conditions that would allow the opening of membership negotiations. Turkey receives 140 million euros each year to prepare for membership.

**Balkans/Central Asia**

The EU has also provided considerable assistance—trade and financial—to the many Muslim countries in the Balkans and Central Asia. EU foreign ministers took the concerns of the Islamic world, as well as the concerns of their Muslim
populations, into account in deciding to intervene in Bosnia and later Kosovo. The influence of the EU is smaller in Central Asia, but it

has contractual relations with all five republics and provides considerable assistance through its Tacis program. The energy resources in Kazakhstan and elsewhere in Central Asia are likely to ensure that this region remains high on the EU’s foreign policy agenda.

Muslims within the EU

The importance of the Muslim communities within the EU, and the growing importance of Islam worldwide, was highlighted last year in a speech by Romano Prodi, EU commission president. Two resolutions in the European Parliament (Ari and Oostlander) also drew attention to the need to improve mutual understanding between the EU and the Islamic world.

The various Muslim communities within the EU have hitherto not operated in a united manner. They have largely concentrated on local, and only occasionally on national, issues. To date, they have not made their presence felt directly on the European scene. Where there has been conflict (Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo), Muslim relief organizations have been active and received EU funding for their activities. But there has not been a united Muslim voice arguing that the EU should take action or change policy.

This reticence to operate on the EU level is perhaps understandable if one considers the many domestic problems facing Muslim communities. There is still much xenophobia apparent within Europe, as can be seen in the support for Jörg Haider in Austria and other right-wing groups in France, Italy, and Belgium. There is also considerable anti-Turk feeling in Germany, location of the second-largest Turkish city (Berlin). The image of the Muslim community tends to be negative, but much less so than the image portrayed in the United States, where even the word Islam tends to be followed by “fundamentalist” or “terrorist.”

The new generation of Muslims in the EU may wish to play a more active political role at national and European levels. This could pose a number of challenges. One issue is whether they will continue to operate through established political parties and structures or will seek to establish more ethnically based organizations to promote their interests? Some political parties within the EU have proven more open to accepting Muslims as members and even candidates than others. There is little evidence, however, of transnational Islam cooperation in Europe.

Conclusion

Muslim countries are becoming more important to the EU, and Muslim communities are becoming more important within the EU. In addition to peace and stability
there are increasing trade and economic ties, especially in the energy sector. Furthermore, in many parts of the Islamic world, the EU is seen in a positive light, both as a model for organizing political discourse between nation states and for its beneficial external policies. It has no pretensions to project military power or to play the “global cop” role. The accession of Turkey to the EU could be an important bridge to the Islamic world.

A new generation of Muslim leaders in the EU faces important challenges within their domestic societies but may also wish to seek a voice at the European level. This could in turn lead to a greater influence on EU foreign policy.
The foregoing discussion of the various aspects of Islam and Muslim communities in Europe and in the United States points both to some basic similarities between the two communities and to some important differences. It also leads to the following conclusions. The most important conclusion is that the Islamic community in Europe and the United States, rather than being a monolithic phenomenon, is highly diverse and divided along many lines.

**Ethnic Profile**

The most important line of distinction within the Muslim community both in Europe and in the United States is still that of ethnicity. Indeed, it is ethnicity rather than religion that forms the basis of group identity. Consequently, Muslim communities in Europe and in the United States organize themselves along ethnic lines. In the United States, this type of division is even deeper because of the existence of an indigenous African-American community with its own very special historical experience and its specific needs and interests. This difference in historical experience and needs is reflected in the political orientation and party affiliations of African-American and other Muslims. Nevertheless, in recent years there has been a tendency within the younger generation of Muslims to overcome these ethnic differences.

**Sectarian Divide**

The second line of division is sectarian. In this respect the most theologically significant divide is between the Shi‘as and the Sunni. But each community has its subdivisions. To illustrate, different schools of Sunni Islam often have their own special mosques. The main division within Shi‘ism is that between the Twelvers and the Seveners (Ismailis). Here, too, however, the younger generation is trying to overcome such divisions. This is especially true in the case of various schools of Sunni Islam.
Secular versus Observant

It is not easy to determine what level of adherence to Islamic religious and moral codes constitutes total observance. Nevertheless, a distinction can be made between those who can be characterized as secular Muslims, whose lives are not organized around the mosque, and the more observant ones for whom the mosque and its related institutions are important elements of their daily lives.

Generational Divide

Muslim communities in Europe and in the United States are increasingly characterized by generational differences, which are affecting nearly all aspects of the community’s life, albeit in an uneven and at times contradictory fashion. What is clear, however, is that both in Europe and the United States, the younger generation of Muslims want to play a more important leadership role within the community. Also, the younger generation is more interested in full participation in the social and political life of the majority society.

Ideological Differences

The community is also distinguished by its ideological differences. The overwhelming majority of the Muslim community in Europe and America are either nonpolitical or adhere to moderate interpretations of Islam and favor working through the existing systems to improve Muslims’ conditions in various areas: economic, legal, social, and political. However, extremist and even violent tendencies exist within these communities and try to attract and subvert Muslim youth. Although a minority, because of the vehemence of their rhetoric and the potential risk that they pose to the security of the majority societies, these groups do serious damage to the Muslim communities of Europe and the United States by projecting a negative image of Islam. Moreover, the words and actions of such groups are manipulated by xenophobic elements, such as neo-Nazi groups, which are uncomfortable with any sort of Muslim presence. Paradoxically, however, at times, the very existence of extremist Muslim groups creates a counterreaction, in the sense that other Muslims, notably the youth, organize themselves to counteract their negative impact.

Integration versus Communalism

Muslim communities in Europe and the United States are divided on the issue of integration into the majority societies or living in separate communities. In this respect, in Europe at least, they mirror a similar ambivalence on the part of the majority societies. The governments of the Muslim communities’ countries of origin, in their desire to control their people often prefer a low level of integration,
especially at the political level. Yet, while the process of the Muslims’ full integration remains incomplete and the road ahead difficult, increasing numbers of Muslims are becoming integrated into the majority societies. However, in many European countries with large Muslim populations, pockets of poor, uneducated, and alienated youth are increasing in numbers. If left untreated, this situation could well increase tensions between Muslim communities and the majority societies, and thus undermine social and perhaps even political stability of those European states that have large Muslim populations.

**New Muslim Thinking**

The Muslim communities of Europe and the United States are intellectually vibrant, and much new thinking on various aspects of Islamic religion, traditions, and culture is taking place among the communities’ members. Part of this intellectual activity is focused on practical issues of how to reconcile the requirement of living in the West and becoming active members of Western societies while preserving their Islamic identity. An important upshot of this process is the development of what has often been referred to as “European Islam.” Although the term “American Islam” has not yet become part of the vocabulary in this field of study, similar processes are operating within the U.S. Muslim community. Moreover, intellectual material produced within Muslim communities of Europe and the United States are finding their way into the rest of the Islamic world and influencing intellectual trends there.

To summarize, the Muslim communities of Europe and the United States are a heterogeneous and dynamic phenomenon animated by a variety of intellectual, religious, and practical forces and concerns. Both communities have made advances in terms of acceptance and integration, but the existence of negative—notably extremist—elements within the communities, and the prevalence of deep resistance and barriers on the part of the majority societies have slowed the process of mutual accommodation and eventual integration without the loss of Muslim religious and cultural identity. Therefore, for the coming decades this is the challenge that will have to be addressed by Muslims and the majority societies in a spirit of tolerance and cooperation.
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